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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the way in which international criminal tribunals 
have changed and evolved over time, using the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia as specific examples. By examining two central societal 
responses to collective violence – justice and truth – this thesis engages with 
ideas regarding post-conflict resolution in the hope of creating a positive 
peace. The following chapters will analyse the IMT and ICTY to determine the 
manner in which developing ideas regarding state sovereignty and 
international intervention have impacted the way in which societies deal with 
mass atrocity. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to expound the correlation 
between law and history in the joint pursuit of retribution and historicization.  
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Introduction 
 
After mass atrocity, what can and should be faced about the past?1 
 
This thesis examines shifting responses to atrocity, rather than merely 
atrocity itself. I argue that it was not until the 1990s that international criminal 
tribunals reflected a wider attempt to protect and promote individual human 
rights, and that prior to this revolution international criminal tribunals 
focused on maintaining state sovereignty and limiting international 
intervention. In analyzing the International Military Tribunal and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, this thesis 
illustrates how wider trends regarding concepts of state sovereignty, 
intervention, human rights and international law impact the choices made in 
the pursuit of justice and truth in post-conflict societies.  
In the wake of mass atrocity, Martha Minow sees “two purposes 
animating societal responses to collective violence: justice and truth”2. This 
thesis will follow this line of thought, arguing that international criminal 
tribunals are the oft chosen mechanism for post-conflict societies and 
represent an attempt to reconcile the needs for retribution and fact-finding in 
the hopes of creating a positive peace.  I will argue that the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg focused on punishment through the 
implementation of justice and that any truth and fact-finding achievements 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Minow, M. Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), p.118  
2 Minow, M. Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, p.9!
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were in service of the greater pursuit of retribution. In contrast, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia represents a true 
duality of responses.  
There has never been a time during the past century when our planet 
was free from mass murder. Between 60 million and 150 million people have 
perished in episodes of mass killings during the 20th century alone3. In the 
wake of tragedy, what should be faced about the past? Achieving justice and 
discovering the truth are both crucial for the facilitation and reconstruction of 
post-conflict societies.  
International criminal tribunals as mechanisms of post-conflict 
resolution are reflective of evolutions in academic and political thinking. In 
the wake of mass atrocity, methods of post-conflict resolution are 
implemented as a means of addressing the past, allowing victim’s stories to 
be heard and facilitating reconciliation. The methods of post-conflict 
resolution have changed and evolved over time, and this thesis will chart the 
progression of the specific contrivance of the international criminal tribunal.  
Chapter One analyses the International Military Tribunal and argues 
that the central aim motivating this tribunal was the pursuit of justice and the 
allocation of individual criminal responsibility for specific crimes, with a 
focus on the crime of aggressive war. While the establishment of a credible 
historical record was considered a worthy byproduct of the proceedings, it 
was by no means the central focus of the Allied Powers. Though truth was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The large variation in estimated numbers is a result of inaccurate sources and limited 
fieldwork/excavation, often as a result of uncooperative states; Valentino, B.A. Final 
Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2004), p.1  
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sought in the IMT, it was truth in the pursuit of justice rather than 
reconciliation. I analyse the International Military Tribunal for its contribution 
to the foundations of international law and the framework that would later be 
adopted and adapted by international criminal tribunals.  
In contrast, Chapters Two and Three study the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the two-pronged approach adopted 
by the tribunal since its inception. Chapter Two reflects on the changes in 
academic and political thinking that impacted the ICTY in its mandate as a 
mechanism to pursue justice for war crimes, with a particular focus on crimes 
against humanity and genocide. This chapter highlights the ways in which 
the very idea of justice itself changed as a result of new concepts of state 
sovereignty and legal intervention: justice for the individual began to take 
precedence.  
While Chapter Two explores the ICTY in terms of its pursuit of justice 
as a societal response to collective violence, the third chapter of this thesis 
analyses this tribunal in terms of its pursuit of truth. The establishment of a 
credible historical record was a validated aim of the ICTY since it’s creation. 
This chapter looks historiographically at the place of history within the 
courtroom and analyses specific elements of the ICTY’s procedure and 
process to argue that the fact-finding mission of the tribunal is limited and 
flawed.  
It is my intention to look not only at the historical evolution of 
international criminal tribunals, nor merely the role of historical context in the 
workings of criminal tribunals. Instead, I also attempt to investigate the ways 
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in which the legal framework of an international criminal tribunal places 
limitations and qualifications on the historical record that is created as a result 
of the process. It is therefore both the ‘input’ and the ‘output’ of history that is 
my concern.   
This thesis engages with the evolution of ideas regarding human rights 
and state sovereignty, from the doctrine of responsibility toward the state to 
respect for the individual. The International Military Tribunal (herein referred 
to as the IMT) is commonly viewed as a stalwart of human rights. In this 
thesis I revisit this myth and highlight the ways in which the Tribunal at 
Nuremberg and subsequent development of the United Nations (herein 
referred to as the UN) actually served to maintain the status quo that saw 
state sovereignty as an inherent right.  
The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (herein known as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or ICTY) is 
representative of the evolution of these ideas throughout the latter half of the 
20th century. Established as a means of prosecuting the war criminals of the 
Balkan conflicts of the 1990’s, the ICTY was the first international criminal 
tribunal that represented the concepts of sovereignty as responsibility and the 
true indivisibility of human rights4.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The Balkan conflict refers to the conflicts in the geographical locale of the former 
Yugoslavia, with focus on the events between 1991 and 1995 in Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and between 1998 and 1999 in Kosovo. The collective term ‘Balkan Conflict’ is 
used interchangeably throughout the essay with the terms Yugoslav Wars and Wars of 
Yugoslav Succession, for the events over which the ICTY has jurisdiction.  
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It is through the implementation of international criminal tribunals to 
prosecute war criminals that the twin agendas of justice and truth have 
become intertwined and collectively served. International criminal tribunals 
self-consciously contribute to the collective memory of the time period over 
which it’s jurisdiction presides. This thesis seeks to critically analyse the legal 
mechanisms of the IMT and the ICTY. This work is an exploration of the 
limitations and challenges of international law, and its application in the 
criminal tribunal framework, in its attempts to contribute to the historical 
record of a given event.  
The succeeding chapters will chart the historical evolution of 
international criminal tribunals from the IMT to the ICTY; the international 
law that underlies their jurisdictions; and the changing ideas regarding 
international rights and responsibilities of intervention through political 
means.  
This thesis attempts to explore the intricate interconnectedness of 
human rights, international law and history in the 20th century. Through the 
examples of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at the Hague, the 
reader will be invited to re-evaluate ideas regarding the evolution of 
individual rights, the transformation of sovereignty and the challenges of 
adopting legal mechanisms as a means of establishing an accurate historical 
record.  This thesis traces the process of international criminal tribunals as a 
means of achieving justice and truth, a pursuit inherently impacted by the 
changing political and academic thinking. 
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Chapter One 
A Recollection of Nuremberg 
 
 In the wake of the mass atrocity that wreaked havoc across Europe at 
the hands of the Nazis, the international community was forced to react. As a 
product of legalist thinking and as a means of reinstating the pre-existing 
balance of power, the Allied victors implemented an international criminal 
tribunal whose mandate it was to prove individual criminal responsibility for 
specific war crimes. If we are to look at the two societal responses posed by 
Martha Minow, the IMT is representative of a mechanism largely animated by 
a call for justice through retribution. 
This Chapter seeks to situate the IMT within the historical evolution of 
international and humanitarian law; illustrating how the IMT made use of 
existing legal mechanisms and analyzing the way in which the framework of 
international criminal tribunals was altered for application in the future, most 
notably in the ICTY. In analyzing the legislative advances made as a result of 
the IMT, this thesis argues that the Nuremberg Charter and the UN in their 
earliest forms represent a maintenance of state sovereignty to the detriment of 
genuine mechanisms for the protection of individual rights. This Chapter will 
argue conclusively that while crimes against humanity were a significant 
element of the Indictment at Nuremberg, they were not considered to be of 
the utmost consequence. The Allied victors were more concerned with 
punishing rogue actions against the state than actions against the individual 
as a means of maintaining world peace and security.  
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While mass murder is as old as the human race, it had become an issue 
of world-wide importance in the 20th century, and it was World War Two in 
particular that prompted a widespread reassessment of the current balance of 
power: respect for human dignity was recognised as a prerequisite for a 
peaceful world5. As the world’s power players strove to right the wrongs of 
the past, it was legal mechanisms they turned to in their pursuit of a future 
peace. The IMT was the first modern international criminal tribunal 
established in the wake of the devastation of war. The IMT was established by 
the victors of World War Two, as an international tribunal committed to 
finding individual criminal responsibility on four counts and was the first 
tribunal established as a result of newly ratified international laws.   
The Nuremberg Trials were a series of military trials, the most famous 
of which was the Trial of the Major War Criminals, which convened between 
November 20th 1945 and October 1st 1946 at the International Military 
Tribunal6. In studying the evolution of the human rights movement, 
international law and history writing, the IMT represents the beginning of a 
broad spectrum of time and change. The IMT “proved to be the foundation of 
what has now become a permanent feature of modern international justice”7 
and the framework established for its successful implementation would go on 
to form the basis of its most infamous successor: the ICTY.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Sellars, K. The Rise and Rise of Human Rights (United Kingdom: Sutton Publishing Ltd, 2002), 
p.x 
6 Unless otherwise explicitly stated, where mention is made of the Nuremberg Trials or the 
IMT, the reference applies to the Trial of the Major War Criminals.  
7 Overy, R. “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making”, in From Nuremberg to 
the Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice ed. Sands, P. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), p.2 !
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The IMT and its national counterparts are representative of a universal 
declaration to end impunity for and punish authors of mass atrocity. Yet it is 
important to note that while this aim is honorable, any form of retribution has 
fundamental shortcomings. There is no such thing as an appropriate 
punishment for the indescribable cruelty and wanton destruction that these 
tribunals are mandated to judge. “For these crimes, no punishment is severe 
enough”, stated Hannah Arendt in the wake of the trials of the Nazi 
leadership. “This guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters 
any and all legal systems”8.  
As a means of capitalizing on the successes of the legal mechanisms 
imposed at Nuremberg, the Tribunal was followed by a series of international 
gestures aimed at outlawing the newly defined crimes, as well as the 
promotion and protection of more broadly recognised human rights9. The 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1946 codified 30 
basic rights which signatory nations adopted to illustrate “their faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person 
and the equal rights of men and women”10. On December 11th 1946, the UN 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 96(I) entitled “The Crime of 
Genocide”, affirming that genocide would henceforth be known as a crime 
under international law. In addition, the UN adopted General Assembly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Arendt, H. quoted in Bass, G.J. Stay The Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes 
Tribunals (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), p.13 
9 Bass, G.J. Stay The Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), p.204 
10 United Nations General Assembly, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, adopted and 
proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) (10 December 1948), Preamble  
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Resolution 260, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide in 1948.  
Furthermore, the International Law Commission, a branch of the UN, 
adopted seven principles of international law in 1950 that were “principles of 
international law recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in 
the Judgement of the Tribunal”11. Richard Goldstone, the first Prosecutor of 
the ICTY, sees the recognition of crimes against humanity as “the most 
important legacy of Nuremberg”12, thus drawing a direct link between the 
IMT and the promotion of individual rights and humanitarian law.  
 
An Appropriate Punishment? 
As the final sounds of war rang out across Europe, the leaders of the 
victorious Allies found themselves with yet more work to be done. The 
defeated Nazi party leaders needed to be brought to account for the crimes 
perpetrated against their own peoples and those in other aggrieved countries. 
The Allies themselves saw their nations as the victims of German criminality 
and were “thus resolute in their desire for some sort of justice”13.   
The Moscow Declaration of November 1943 represents the Allied 
nations determination to punish Nazi war criminals even before the 
successful conclusion of the war. The Declaration, signed on the 1st of the 
month by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin, 
states that “those responsible for, or [those who] have taken a consenting part !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 95 (1): Principles of International Law 
recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal”, 
(1950) (A/CN.4/SER.A/1950)  
12 Bass, G.J. Stay The Hand of Vengeance, p.204 
13 Bass, G.J. Stay The Hand of Vengeance, p.148 
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in the above atrocities… will be sent back to the countries in which their 
abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished 
according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the Free 
Governments which will be created therein”14. The gauntlet had been thrown, 
and the political will for justice would only increase as the war raged on. 
The four Allies formalised their commitment to prosecute war crimes 
by signing the London Agreement on the 8th of August 1945, which 
encapsulated the mandate undertaken in the adoption of “an International 
Military Tribunal for the trials of war criminals”15. The IMT constituted the 
first time in history that a group of political leaders were brought before the 
international bar to answer for the actions of their state16. Yet in the early 
days, in this post-war situation where actions were “governed by political as 
much as legal considerations”17, an international tribunal was by no means a 
foregone conclusion.  
In the initial aftermath of the war, the British delegates promoted the 
concept of summary execution of war criminals who were found and 
properly identified. In a war that had seen devastation wrought on British 
territory and a high number of British deaths, the general public demanded 
firm action. While some form of legal mechanism was considered as an 
option, doubts were voiced surrounding the ability of a prosecution team to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 _______, “Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security” or “The Moscow 
Declaration” (1 November 1943) 
15 United Nations, “Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex to the Agreement 
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis” or 
“London Agreement”, (8 August 1945) 
16 Sellars, K. The Rise and Rise of Human Rights, p.30 
17 Overy, R. “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making”, p.24 
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provide solid forensic evidence of identifiable war crimes18. In addition, the 
British legal consultants remained skeptical that a proper legal foundation for 
the trials could be found in existing international law, and were therefore 
doubtful as to the success of any proposed tribunal19. In a tense situation that 
was as much about politics as it was about justice, the British were wary of 
committing to a mode of punishment that showed such an obvious point of 
weakness.  
There were those in the American elite who agreed with the principle 
of mass execution, evident particularly in the ideas of the US Treasury 
Department’s Henry Morgenthau. The Morgenthau Plan, with its austere 
aims of land division, de-militarization, re-education and leadership 
punishment, has become “synonymous with a devastatingly punitive 
peace”20.  
Morgenthau’s proposal was sent to President Roosevelt on September 
5, 1944 and is most notable for its method concerning the treatment of “arch 
criminals” of the war. Working from a list drawn up based on “obvious guilt” 
recognised by the UN, military authorities would be instructed “with respect 
to all persons who are on such a list” to apprehend and identify the suspect, 
before putting him or her to death by firing squad21. For the “lower-level 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity”, a trial before the Allied military 
commission and swift execution upon conviction was suggested22. However, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Overy, R. “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making”, p.7 
19 Overy, R. “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making”, p.7 
20 Bass, G.J. Stay The Hand of Vengeance, p.157 
21 Morgenthau, H. “The Morgenthau Plan”, Germany is Our Problem (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1945) 
22 Bass, G.J. Stay The Hand of Vengeance, p.158 
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a general unease was ever-present over the use of violent force to condemn 
the actions of the Nazi leadership, a government that had become 
synonymous worldwide for atrocity and bloodshed. Such action was in direct 
conflict with the democratic liberal norms upon which the Allied nations 
(with the exception of the Soviet Union) were founded.  
 It was the US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, who first suggested 
that the Americans instigate an international tribunal to examine the crimes of 
the top Nazi’s. In his view, a criminal trial would enable the world to see the 
true nature of Hitler’s regime, while simultaneously emphasizing the virtues 
of the Allies who had put a stop to it23. To Stimson, a criminal tribunal would 
succeed in the dual aim of punishment and prevention. “We should always 
have in mind the necessity of punishing effectively enough to bring home to 
the German people the wrongdoing done in their name, and thus prevent 
similar conduct in the future”, he stated. “Remember, this punishment is for 
the purpose of prevention and not for vengeance”24.  
In the eyes of Lieutenant Colonel Murray Bernays, the American legal 
specialist in charge of investigating Nazi war crimes, to proceed with any 
other form of recourse would be a mistake. To react against violence with 
violence, as some had suggested, would “furnish apparent justification for 
what the Nazis themselves had taught and done”25. In the end, it was this 
reasonable blend of pragmatism and ingrained legalism that saw the IMT 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Sellars, K. The Rise and Rise of Human Rights, p.26 
24 Stimson-McCloy Conversation of 28 August 1944, recorded in Smith, B. The American Road 
to Nuremberg: The Documentary Record (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1981), p.23 
25 Sellars, K. The Rise and Rise of Human Rights, p.27 
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come to fruition26. Yet, to adopt this method would involve a heavy reliance 
on the provisions of international law and the necessity of international 
cooperation, both of which showed signs of fallibility.   
 
Constitution of the Court   
It was in the Constitution of the court set up in Nuremberg that both 
the political and legal questions surrounding the validity of the trial needed 
to be addressed. It was essential to establish a strong and resilient mandate 
that could withstand the numerous legal issues that the Tribunal would face. 
The war crimes defined at the end of the First World War and subject to 
common agreement included crimes that had evidently been perpetrated by 
the Nazi system, including systematic terrorism, torture of civilians and the 
usurpation of sovereignty27. Yet the difficulty in this case was to define the 
crimes in specific language that could be applied to the men in the dock, both 
in terms of the acts they had been directly involved in and in terms of their 
individual responsibility for those acts. The final list of twenty-two 
defendants were widely accepted as being representative of important aspects 
of the dictatorship and difficulties lay in proving their direct involvement in 
the criminal regime28.  
It was in the framing of the Indictment, formally issued on 19th October 
1945, that the IMT began to impact and change the face of international law. 
The four charges that the defendants faced, in various combinations, were “a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Bass, G.J. Stay The Hand of Vengeance, p.157  
27 Overy, R. “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making”, p.14 
28 Overy, R. “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making”, p.13 
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common conspiracy to wage aggressive war”, “crimes against peace”, “war 
crimes” and “crimes against humanity”29. It was the charges of “conspiracy to 
wage aggressive war” and “crimes against humanity” that required the most 
legal ingenuity on behalf of the Prosecution team and would thus most 
heavily impact the international law that was written as a result of the trial 
process at Nuremberg.  
It was the IMT that propounded the concept of individual 
responsibility in an international legal framework, thereby instilling the 
notion that individuals have irrebutable duties and obligations under both 
national and international law30: “Crimes against international law are committed 
by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”31. 
With these words, the Nuremberg Judgement of October 1st 1946 
effectively disputed the long-standing argument that international law 
applied only to states. The adoption of the concept of individual 
responsibility signalled a paradigm shift. The principle of individual 
responsibility for criminal violations of international law is now applied daily 
around the world, particularly in legal settings such as the ICTY32. It has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 “Charter and Judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: History and 
Analysis”, Memorandum by the Secretary-General of the United Nations General Assembly (1949) 
30 Clapham, A. “Issues of complexity, complicity and complementarity: from the Nuremberg 
Trials to the dawn of the new International Criminal Court” in From Nuremberg to the Hague: 
The Future of International Criminal Justice ed. Sands, P. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p.31 
31 “Charter and Judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: History and 
Analysis”, Memorandum by the Secretary-General of the United Nations General Assembly (1949) 
32 Kelly, M. and McCormack, T. “Contributions of the Nuremberg Trial to the Subsequent 
Development of International Law”, in The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or 
Institutionalised Violence? ed. Blumenthal, D. and McCormack, T. (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008), p.102 
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provided the foundation for human rights law that has come to create the 
rights and duties of the individual in relation to the state33.  
The IMT Charter and Judgement instilled two other key principles in 
terms of individual responsibility for violations of international law. Firstly, 
Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter rejected the ‘sovereign immunity’ 
principle in declaring that “the official position of [a] defendant shall not be 
considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment”34. 
The Nuremberg Judgement highlighted that the “very essence of the Charter” 
lay in the idea that “individuals have international duties which transcend the 
national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state”. By 
enabling the IMT to declare ultra vires35 and criminal, actions which were state 
directed and sanctioned, those who conceived of and brought into being the 
IMT effectively overturned hundreds of years of law, history and philosophy. 
The IMT succeeded in limiting the states authority over its citizens and 
imposing instead duties and obligations upon the state.  
Secondly, the defence of command responsibility was diminished in 
the eyes of the Tribunal. Article 8 of the Charter specifically provided that: 
“The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of 
a superior shall not free him from responsibility”36. However, in conformity 
with the law of all nations “the order may be urged in mitigation of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Clapham, A. “Issues of complexity, complicity and complementarity: from the Nuremberg 
Trials to the dawn of the new International Criminal Court”, p.33 
34 “Charter and Judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: History and 
Analysis”, Memorandum by the Secretary-General of the United Nations General Assembly (1949) 
35 Translation: “Beyond Power” 
36 “Charter and Judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: History and 
Analysis”, Memorandum by the Secretary-General of the United Nations General Assembly (1949) 
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punishment”37. As the Judgement declared in respect to the defence of 
command responsibility, “the true test is not the existence of the order, but 
whether moral choice was in fact possible”38. Thus, the IMT’s Charter and 
Judgements provided a framework in regards to the bounds and limitations 
of the concept of individual responsibility.   
 
Crimes of Aggressive War   
The IMT was plagued from the outset by issues of legality and validity. 
It was the criminalization of aggressive war that was especially contentious in 
terms of legality. Waging a war had never previously been a supreme crime 
and responsibility for war making had always rested with the state rather 
than the individual. In this way, “Nazi leaders were being charged with 
actions which, although morally reprehensible, were not illegal when they 
were committed”39. It was through the Indictment of the conspiracy to wage 
aggressive war that arguments of retroactivity were leveled at the Tribunal. In 
the eyes of historian Richard Overy: “To define the war-making acts of the 
Nazi government as crimes required international law to be written 
backwards”40. Justice Robert Jackson, the lead American prosecutor, was 
forced to confront this contentious issue from the outset, using his Opening 
Statement on November 21st 1945 to illustrate the existing legal foundation for 
the charge of conspiring to wage aggressive war.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 “Charter and Judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: History and 
Analysis”, Memorandum by the Secretary-General of the United Nations General Assembly (1949) 
38 “Charter and Judgement of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: History and 
Analysis”, Memorandum by the Secretary-General of the United Nations General Assembly (1949) 
39 Sellars, K. The Rise and Rise of Human Rights, p.27 
40 Overy, R. “The Nuremberg Trials: International Law in the Making”, p.15 
! #"!
In particular, Jackson pointed to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed by 
World War Two aggressors including Germany and Japan in 1928. Article 
One committed the signatory nations to renouncing war as an instrument of 
dispute resolution in foreign policy: “They condemn resolution to war for the 
solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of 
national policy in their relations with one another”41. Despite the fact that the 
Pact was a statement of intent rather than a binding international convention, 
Jackson and the Prosecution Team in their Opening Statement declared that 
signature of the Kellogg-Briand Pact heralded the signatory states intended 
outlawing of war and the condemnation of aggressive war as an illegal and 
criminal action42. In the eyes of Justice Jackson, “this pact altered the legal 
status of war” and formed the judicial cornerstone of the charges of 
committing war in violation of treaties43.  
Both the American and British Prosecution teams were “compelled to 
reinterpret the meaning, intent and legal status of the interwar resolutions 
dealing with the problem of war”44. British Prosecutor Hartley Shawcross 
further developed Jackson’s foundational argument, reinterpreting the 
longstanding legal principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege45. Shawcross 
agreed with the principle that it was invalid to punish a person for an act that 
was not designated a crime at the time it was committed. However, he argued 
that it was valid to retrospectively add a punishment to an act that had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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already been designated to be against the law46. In this way, Shawcross and 
the British Prosecution argued that even though the Kellogg-Briand Pact did 
not specify punishment for the conspiracy to wage aggressive war, “its 
renunciation of war implied the need for punishment”47. It was therefore the 
due responsibility of the IMT, under existing international legal parameters, 
to conceive of and enforce that punishment.  
The Nuremberg Indictment’s criminalization of aggressive war 
attracted further uncertainty with the question of selective justice and the 
overarching validity of the Tribunal48. Specific elements of the mandate 
further suggest that truth and the establishment of an accurate historical 
record were not of the utmost priority to the creators of the IMT.  
The selective nature of the IMT’s system of indictments served to 
“distort the truth about the Second World War… that all sides fought a 
savage war, unbound by either morality or the Geneva Convention”49. The 
trial itself was meant to be an exercise in didactic legality, a form for 
education as well as retribution50. General Telford Taylor, who served in the 
IMT as an assistant to Chief Counsel Jackson, recalled the documentary and 
didactic function of the Tribunal when he spoke of the importance that 
“incredible events be established by clear and public proof, so that no one can 
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ever doubt that they were fact and not fable”51. Yet by rejecting evidence of 
Allied war crimes, and eliminating the legal validity of the tu quoque defence, 
the historical record produced by the Tribunal is distinctly one-sided.  
In the IMT the defence of tu quoque52 was ruled irrelevant “with such 
predetermined speed and emphasis that it was obvious that the judges were 
bent on silencing any allegations about Allied war crimes”53. It was with the 
immediate dismissal of any evidence of Allied misconduct that a fatal legal 
flaw would come to characterize the IMT in posterity. Tu quoque evidence and 
defence is crucial within the vocabulary of any fair trial, and is highly relevant 
in any assessment of whether a particular mode of warfare is “justified by 
military necessity or counts as a war crime”54. By not taking into 
consideration, or even entering on to court record, evidence of alleged Allied 
war crimes the judgement of alleged Axis war crimes is impacted and the 
historical record remains incomplete. In existing international law, jus in 
bello55 denoted the limits of acceptable wartime conduct and incorporated a 
concept of comparability of action. Yet, the IMT was the first to embellish and 
then apply these limitations to only one aggressor within a broader conflict.  
The Nuremberg Charter “was notable for the amnesty that the Allies 
had granted themselves”56. The IMT was established to punish the crimes of 
the defeated enemy and there was never any suggestion that aggression or 
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war crimes in a more general sense would be targeted. In many ways, the 
Tribunal “retrospectively validated the Allied cause”57 and deemed all actions 
of warfare necessary in the fight for triumph over the Axis forces. The legacy 
of the ‘Good War’ created at the Tribunal would permeate the historical 
record.  
It was not only the historical record of the events of World War Two 
that were impacted by the IMT, as the negative connotation of ‘victor’s justice’ 
would plague opinions of the trial process specifically at Nuremberg and 
more generally. Although a success in its aim to prosecute Axis war criminals 
and perpetrators of crimes of aggressive war and crimes against humanity, 
the IMT was inherently flawed in terms of legality within the trial process. 
While victor’s justice was not a new concept, its application at Nuremberg 
was particularly extensive. It would be left to future tribunals, with the ICTY 
as the first to adopt and embellish these precedents, to right the wrongs of 
Nuremberg. Most notably, the count of crimes of aggressive war was 
eventually excluded from the constitution of the ICTY, as the concept was 
deemed inherently tainted with the stench of injustice. 
 
Crimes Against Humanity 
The idea of prosecuting those acts that would fall under the category of 
crimes against humanity in the IMT “did not cause nearly as much surprise… 
because it was not such a new idea after all”58. The notion that rulers could 
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fall below a bearable standard in the handling of their subjects was an ancient 
notion. As Jackson maintained in his Opening Statement, the acts committed 
by the Axis enemy “have been regarded as criminal since the time of Cain”59. 
It was in this way that the Prosecution framed the concept of crimes against 
humanity, arguing that “many of the acts covered by the indictment were in 
fact known to be criminal at the time they were committed”60.  
Crimes such as mass murder, torture, forced transportation and 
enslavement were not novel concepts by the mid-20th century. However, 
never before in history had the international community witnessed these 
crimes being perpetrated on such a widespread scale or in such a ruthlessly 
all-encompassing manner. The future jurisdiction for crimes against 
humanity, as first defined in Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter was that 
“state agents who authorized torture or genocide against their own 
populations were criminally responsible, in international law, and might be 
punished by any court capable of catching them”61. This statement is 
summative of the wider legal legacy of crimes against humanity at 
Nuremberg: that individuals had the right to have their basic human rights 
protected by their government, and that all other governments had a 
correlative duty to ensure that those rights were upheld.  
In this commitment to the protection of the rights of the individual, a 
change in perspective in regards to the concept of state sovereignty was 
noticeably emerging. Yet while it is important to recognise that crimes against 
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humanity were a significant element of the Indictment at Nuremberg, this 
thesis argues that they were not the most consequential. The prosecution of 
the violation of individual rights was overshadowed by the Great Powers’ 
intent to secure justice for crimes against the state, and the implementation of 
a balance of power that would ensure world peace.  
The Allied nations were confronted with the issue of trying to establish 
a Tribunal with the mandate to prosecute all of the crimes that the Nazi 
leadership had perpetrated throughout World War Two. Despite the 
historical antecedents of crimes against humanity, the concept became legally 
problematic when applied to crimes perpetrated against German people by 
their own government. The criminalization of these acts “violated the 
principle of international law that the internal affairs of a sovereign state were 
its own business”62. While none of the crimes perpetrated by the Axis nations 
were unfamiliar, the prosecution of these crimes by “non-nationals asserting 
an unprecedented universality of jurisdiction” was a new phenomenon63. It 
was only by the linking of Nazi atrocities against their own people with a 
more general conspiracy to wage aggressive war that Jackson and the 
Prosecution team were able to bring crimes against humanity perpetrated by 
a sovereign state outside of war under the bounds of international law. As 
head of the American delegation at the London Conference, Jackson was 
aware of the limitations that existed in terms of contemporary international 
law and foreign policy: 
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“It has been a general principle of foreign policy of our Government… that the 
internal affairs of another government are not ordinary our business. The reason that 
this program of extermination of Jews and destruction of the rights of minorities 
becomes an international concern is this: it was part of a plan for making an illegal 
war”64.  
 
Lieutenant Bernays concluded that “conspiracy to wage aggressive 
war could rightfully include everything the regime had done since coming to 
power on 30 January 1933… deliberate repression of the German people”65. 
This proclamation stands in direct contrast to the sentiment of the victors 
following World War One. After the massacre of the Armenian population in 
1915, the American and Japanese representatives of the commission 
formulated to investigate the deaths argued that these were not international 
crimes because they were atrocities perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire 
against its own citizens66. This distinct change in legal parameters highlights a 
fundamental shift in human rights ideology, where by 1945 crimes against 
Germany’s own population were included in the Nuremberg Indictment as 
crimes against humanity. This is illustrative of the constantly changing and 
evolving nature of international law and approaches to international crime.  
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The crimes against humanity count “reached behind the iron curtain of 
Westphalian state sovereignty67 and held that individuals have international 
human rights which states cannot jeopardize”68. It was from this starting 
point that further ideas regarding the evolution of state sovereignty, 
international responsibilities and individual rights came to fruition, 
culminating in the Responsibility to Protect which will be analysed and 
discussed in Chapter Two.  
International law was historically binding on states, not on persons, yet 
to this classic doctrine “an exception has now been made in the case of 
individuals who commit crimes which are of such an ideologically motivated 
heinousness as to permit classification as crimes against humanity”69. The 
case of United States vs Ohlendorf was one of the twelve trials held in U.S 
Military Courts at the end of World War Two. The judgement in this case set 
a precedent that would be stand as a watershed moment in the development 
of international human rights law and the tribunals that would be created to 
enforce it.  
“Crimes against humanity can only come within the purview of this 
basic code of humanity because the State involved”, the judgement read, 
“owing to indifference, impotency or complicity, has been unable or has 
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refused to halt the crimes and punish the individuals”70. This definition made 
crimes against humanity applicable to “tyrannous behavior within a state as 
much as to wartime conflict between states” and facilitated the ability of the 
international community to intercede despite the longstanding political 
tradition of non-intervention in the activities of sovereign states. It was this 
definition of crimes against humanity that would be drawn upon as the 
foundation of the ICTY indictments.  
 
The International Military Tribunal and Genocide 
Prohibition of the persecution of ethnic groups “runs like a golden 
thread through the defining moments of the human rights movement”71. The 
IMT and its aftermath presented the term ‘genocide’ to the world community 
as an international crime which urgently demanded specific repression; “not 
indeed new in human experience but now newly described and defined, with 
a view to preventing its recurrence”72. Although the Judgement of 
Nuremberg never used the term, it went on to describe in great detail what 
was in the process of being formulated as the crime of genocide.  
The term ‘genocide’ emerged in the early 1940’s while the Nazis 
continued to carry out their crimes73. The Polish Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin 
was the first to coin the term and publish it in the work, Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe published in November 1944. Lemkin went on to become a major force !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in the drafting and implementation of the UN Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Genocide in 1948, which gave his new term a legal 
meaning “narrower than he had intended yet still much broader than the 
colloquial sense of total, state-organized physical extermination”74. It is 
important to note that the IMT did not prosecute the specific crime of 
genocide, as Lemkin’s definition “could not apply to the Jews, who were not a 
nation”, but that under the terms of the more general ‘crimes against 
humanity’ category could be included for the deliberate persecution and 
murder of Jews, gypsies and other minority groups75.  
With the adoption of the Convention by the UN General Assembly on 
the 1st of December 1948, genocide became “whether committed in a time of 
peace or a time of war… a crime under international law”76. The Convention 
broadened the term ‘genocide’ to encompass “acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”77. 
In addition, Lemkin had hoped for the inclusion of the systematic elimination 
of political and social groups. Thus a new legal discipline of international 
criminal law emerged from the Convention with a direct link to the 
Nuremberg Trials and the criminalization of government actions towards 
their own people. This legal process has expanded significantly on the 
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narrower understanding of genocide as based on the Holocaust yet 
limitations still exist78.  
A glaring deficiency of the Convention lies in “its retreat from 
universal jurisdiction” whereby perpetrators could be brought to trial in any 
country where they may be apprehended regardless of the location of the 
crime79. While initial ideas for “an unchallengeable court established by the 
UN to enforce this newly defined international law” were debated for a short 
time, the Genocide Convention was eventually adopted with no more 
enforcement than the national jurisdictions of States in whose territories the 
criminal acts had occurred80. Being a signatory to the Convention required 
states to punish, either domestically or “by such international criminal 
tribunal as may have jurisdiction”, acts which were intended to destroy in 
whole or part a national, ethnic or racial group, committed by anyone 
“whether they be constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals”81. In this way we see how the Convention “provided the legal 
mechanism which would later be triggered to challenge the sovereignty of the 
internally oppressive state”, in instances such as the former Yugoslavia in the 
conflict of the 1990s82.   
While the Convention succeeded in making genocidal acts illegal, there 
were severe limitations on the ability of the international community to 
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demand justice and accountability for violations in other states. The onus 
remained on the state in the absence of any universal mechanism. The refusal 
of the international community to act upon the powers granted by the 
Genocide Convention in the years immediately following its adoption are 
illustrative of the pervasive desire to retain the largely unimpeded rights of 
the state83. It would take a revision of ideas regarding state sovereignty and 
the legality of international intervention, such as that prompted by the New 
World Order delegates to the UN, to encourage the international community 
to act upon their enshrined rights and responsibilities.  
 
The United Nations and Human Rights: An Inauspicious Beginning  
While the Nuremberg Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) asserted that atrocities within sovereign states were 
indeed a matter for international law, the emphasis remained on the issue of 
maintaining world peace and security rather than the need to protect the 
human rights of the individual. In the wake of the League of Nation’s failed 
attempts to protect minority rights, and the devastating destruction caused by 
the Nazi’s disrespect for humanity as a whole, the rights of the individual 
within the nation were at the forefront of the world’s attention in the form of 
minority rights.  
Yet in the UDHR, it was the peaceful relations between nations rather 
than governments and their people that were of central concern. The US 
Secretary of State in 1948 claimed that “governments that systematically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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disregard the rights of their own people are not likely to respect the rights of 
other nations and other people, and are likely to seek their objectives by coercion 
and force”84. The Preamble for the UDHR itself highlights this key emphasis: 
“Equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of peace in the world”85.  
While there are few who deny that the UN Charter was the first treaty 
to make human rights a matter for global concern, the Charter pledges were 
“circumscribed by other factors”. It became the duty of signatory nations to 
“promote” human rights rather than to guarantee them as a matter of law for 
all citizens86. At this point in time when political tensions were high and 
competition between the historical great powers of Great Britain and France, 
and the rising powers of the United States and the Soviet Union, for 
dominance and influence was ever-increasing, no nation “was prepared to be 
bound by international law in respect of the treatment of its own subjects”87.  
Mark Mazower’s essay The Strange Triumph of Human Rights illustrates 
how human rights played a critical role in the academic and political thinking 
of the early 40s. The Nazi persecution came to represent the idea that rights 
could only be defended internationally and that the protection of minority 
rights as had been campaigned for by the League of Nations, would no longer 
offer sufficient protection to those in danger. While recognising the 
importance of human rights on a public and academic platform, Mazower 
argues that it was the issue of domestic jurisdiction that continued to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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dominate political thinking at that time. The new Charter of the UN “would 
have to make some reference to rights”88 as a result of wartime promises and 
public opinion, yet the Great Power’s were wary of making a wholehearted 
commitment. As summed up by Charles Webster, Foreign Office adviser and 
historian, “Our policy is to avoid guarantee of human rights though we might 
not object to a declaration”89. There was a need amongst the Great Powers to 
ensure that “the human rights provisions of the UN Charter would not be 
automatically applicable at home”90.  
There was a call, most notably from the British and American delegates 
at Dumbarton Oaks, to ensure that the new organisation had a limited ability 
to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states. In conclusion, the UN 
Charter that emerged from the San Francisco conference in 1945 bore the 
“unmistakable traces of competing interests”91. While it served to highlight 
human rights in the Preamble and main body of the Charter itself, the 
founding document of the UN should not be misconstrued as a conclusive 
agreement in regards to human rights and the role of international 
organisations in the actions of sovereign states. Article 2 of the Charter 
contained the most stringent of domestic jurisdiction clauses that severely 
confined the possible enforcement mechanisms of the newly born UN: 
 
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 Mazower, M. “The Strange Triumph of Human Rights 1933-1950”, The Historical Journal 
(Vol.47 No.2: 2004), p.392 
89 Mazower, M. “The Strange Triumph of Human Rights 1933-1950”, p.392 
90 Mazower, M. “The Strange Triumph of Human Rights 1933-1950”, p.393 
91 Mazower, M. “The Strange Triumph of Human Rights 1933-1950”, p.393 
! $&!
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII”92.  
  
As will be shown in the following chapter, the UN was created with 
the power to intervene in the affairs of the nation for the protection of the 
rights of the individual. Yet in it’s earliest days this power and the 
mechanisms that would eventually enforce it were curtailed by the dominant 
and widely accepted views regarding Westphalian state sovereignty, 
sovereign immunity and the contested validity of international intervention.  
 
Conclusion  
The Nuremberg Judgement and Principles “made it clear that it was 
legitimate under international law to take up questions relating to the human 
rights of nationals mistreated by their governments”93. The antecedents of 
international humanitarian law lie in the Nuremberg Principles and the 
foundation of international interest in the protection of individual rights is 
evident in the establishment of the UN and its adoption of the 
aforementioned resolutions. Yet, there has been cause for further expansion 
and redefinition as crimes against humanity have continually been 
perpetrated upon groups.  
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In the eyes of legal historian Geoffrey Robertson, “it was the 
internecine bloodbaths in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda that caused the 
Security Council to exercise a power to punish crimes against humanity that it 
has actually possessed from the outset”94. It is to the events in the former 
Yugoslavia that this thesis will now turn attention. While the Nuremberg 
Tribunals are illustrative of many of the foundational elements of 
international criminal tribunals and international law, it is the ICTY that 
called for further elaboration and improvement of these mechanisms. 
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Chapter Two 
Continuity and Change: The Foundation of the ICTY 
 
The previous chapter elaborated on the precedents established at 
Nuremberg in the realm of international law and the human rights movement 
were elaborated on in the previous chapter. Yet, this framework was “largely 
ignored until the ethnic cleansing policy of the Bosnian Serbs”95. Throughout 
the period of the Cold War, the attention of the world was no longer focused 
on the pursuit of human rights but on the maintenance of the balance of 
power to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. The prevalence of human 
rights groups and campaigners for minority groups largely diminished 
during this time period and academic thought and debate in this sphere 
dwindled.  
It was not until the outbreak of the War of Yugoslav Succession, 
characterised by the Serbian-led mass killing and deportation of ethnic 
minorities from territorially important regions of the former Yugoslavia, that 
international humanitarian law was drawn upon once again. While the 
mechanism of an international criminal tribunal was adopted once more as 
the chosen mechanism of post-conflict resolution, there are crucial differences 
that reflect broader changes in academic and political thinking. While the IMT 
was instigated as a means of criminalizing aggressive war and punishing the 
crime of disrupting peace between nations, the ICTY was the first 
international tribunal to focus on the criminalization of the mistreatment of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the individual and the violation of human rights. The ICTY is reflective of 
evolutionary thinking that to address the wrongs of the past, to ensure future 
reconciliation and the maintenance of peace, the status quo had to change. 
Respect for human dignity was brought to the forefront of political and 
academic thinking, and this trend is reflected in the implementation of an 
international criminal tribunal with an irrefutable focus on human rights. In 
this way, we see a continuation of the adoption of a legalist mechanism in the 
pursuit of justice. Yet the essence of the justice pursued had irrevocably 
changed: it was justice for the people rather than justice for the state that was 
of the utmost importance.  
The international response to the War of Yugoslav Succession, or the 
Balkan conflict as it is most commonly known, represent the culmination of 
evolutionary thought in the field of international intervention, state 
sovereignty and individual and minority group rights. While distinct 
progress was made in the wake of World War Two, as previously discussed, 
it was the period of the 1990s which saw a reclassification of state sovereignty 
as a responsibility rather than a right conferred on any territorially and 
politically independent nation. The transformation of sovereignty was “in 
keeping with the transformation of the international system and state-society 
relations by events of the twentieth century”96. The exercise of complete 
control in a world that had become so interconnected was becoming a relative 
impossibility.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Slaughter, A-M. “Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order”, p.288 
! $*!
It is the creation of the ICTY that stands at the forefront of this 
revolution. Representative of a universal declaration to end impunity and 
challenge the status quo of non-intervention, the ICTY effectively adopted 
and adapted the precedents established by the Nuremberg Tribunal in 
keeping with current manifestations of international humanitarian law. The 
ICTY has in many ways established the new norms of international 
intervention and the implementation of the legal mechanism of international 
criminal tribunals in the face of state-sponsored mass violence.   
 
A New Concept of Sovereignty  
The instigation of international criminal tribunals is the “most visible 
sign of the transition from the classical Westphalian system of state 
sovereignty to an international system based on the credo of ‘common 
interest’”97. While the Nuremberg Trials are seen as instilling the fundamental 
principles of international law, as discussed in Chapter One, the ICTY was the 
first ad hoc international tribunal whose statute was a product of the 
accumulation of thinking in the sphere of humanitarian law since then.  
The principles of state sovereignty and international responsibility can 
be seen as coming into conflict in three main instances throughout the conflict 
in the former Yugoslavia. The instance of most importance to this thesis is the 
United Nation’s decision to create an international criminal tribunal to 
prosecute those who broke international laws. It is also important to note that 
such issues could be applied and debated in regards to the NATO bombing of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Kosovo and the decision to engage UN peacekeeping troops in Srebrenica. 
However, both of these events remain largely outside the scope of this essay.  
Historian Damien Hirsch sees the post-Second World War period as 
one of “cross-pollination between humanitarian law and human rights”98. 
Historically, humanitarian law aimed to set limitations on what was 
legitimate in the act of war. Most humanitarian laws were concerned with the 
treatment of individuals in the event of war, most specifically civilians and 
prisoners of war. In contrast, human rights were concerned with defending 
human beings against the arbitrary acts of their own states.  
In the post-WWII period, there has been a rapid increase in the 
convergence of these two fields due to the changing nature of warfare. 
Professor Mary Kaldor sees the Yugoslavian wars of the 1990s as typifying 
this metamorphosis. “War is no longer controlled by sovereign states 
wielding legitimate monopolies of violence”, Kaldor argues. Instead there is a 
prevalence of fighting between ethnically defined social formations that mix 
the characteristics of nationalist struggles with intra-national violence99. It is 
these intra-national conflicts that have brought questions of state sovereignty, 
human rights and international responsibilities into conjunction. 
Classically, international law is the system that “protects the rights of 
sovereign states to be free from external aggression”100. However, following 
the devastation of World War Two and the extent of human suffering, “a 
need was felt to extend the scope of international law so that it could protect !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the rights not only of states but of individuals”101. According to lead 
international relations scholar Stephen Krasner, there are “two clusters of 
values at play in the contemporary environment – state autonomy and human 
rights – which can come into conflict”102. Though the international 
community has consistently recognised sovereignty as a fundamental right, 
“complete autonomy of the sovereign state from outside interference and 
unsolicited intervention has changed over time”103. With the growing 
recognition of the importance of human rights comes the realization that state 
sovereignty must be limited: there are certain things that independent states 
do not have the right to do104. The ‘absolutes’ of the Westphalian system are 
dissolving, and a “competing notion of ‘human security’ is creeping around 
the edges of official thinking”105.  
Historian Mark Mazower charts the progression of the relatively recent 
idea that “rulers of the world make up a kind of international society”106. 
Legalists of the post-World War Two era were quick to point out the flaws of 
the internationalist trend pursued by the League of Nations. What produced 
stability in the eyes of realists such as Carl Schmitt were “legal regimes based 
on power over a clearly delineated territory”: the very premise of the Peace of 
Westphalia107. The UN itself reaffirmed the centrality of the nation state in 
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modern life, working more fully through the mechanism of sovereign states 
than the League had done108.  
The concept of Westphalian sovereignty is embedded in the UN 
Charter itself, with Article 2(7) stating that “nothing… shall authorize the UN 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any State”109. While the UDHR as codified in 1948 is widely interpreted as 
enshrining a commitment to the rights of the individual, “the powers fought 
strongly to make sure it was not binding”110. As a means of subordinating the 
universality of the declaration, the General Assembly insisted that the right of 
national self-determination remain at the forefront of any agreement to 
further the enforcement of the UDHR. Thus, the two Covenants that were 
ratified by member states saw self-determination appear as a “lead right”111.  
It was the emergence within the UN of a powerful bloc of states with a 
different conception of global justice that prompted tacit opposition to this 
status quo. The ‘New World Order’ that emerged after the Cold War was 
“characterised initially… by an unprecedented expansion of the UN’s 
responsibilities and powers in the humanitarian realm” whereby sovereignty 
was no longer regarded as absolute112. Mazower looks to the emergence of 
human rights groups in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and their counterparts 
in Western Europe and the US, as the source of pressure on Western 
governments to speak against human rights violations and internal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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repression. Political decisions such as the cutting of financial aid to 
dictatorships in Central and Latin America, as well as in Africa, signified a 
change in policy direction.  This “reconfiguring of rights, not as part of a 
larger political project led by the state but as an ethical alternative to the 
tyranny of the state” saw human rights emerge at the forefront of political 
considerations113. It was in the midst of this radical shift in thinking that the 
ICTY emerged.  
It became evident on a global scale during the latter half of the 20th 
century that the Westphalian principles of sovereignty are inherently flawed; 
they allowed states to tyrannize their own peoples and create human rights 
catastrophes that not only harmed their own populations, but threatened 
international peace114. The 1990s were characterised by the dominance of 
“state-sponsored massive crimes” as opposed to conventional warfare115. As a 
result, there was a call for “new and much more conditional attitudes towards 
sovereignty” that saw an unprecedented expansion of the UN’s 
responsibilities and powers in the humanitarian realm in concert with the 
strengthening of international legal mechanisms to enforce it’s decisions116.  
The Security Council took an unprecedented step in authorizing the 
use of force “on behalf of civilian populations” in Somalia in 1991, illustrating 
the way in which the interests of the citizens were beginning to compete with, 
and occasionally override, the “formerly unquestioned primacy of purely 
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state interests” and the principle of non-interference117. This new paradigm, 
marked by decisive international intervention on legal grounds, “weds 
traditional humanitarianism with the law of human rights”118. Thus, we see a 
shift away from states as the dominant subjects of international law and an 
inclusion of the individual as a rival focus119.    
The limitations now placed on the powers, immunities and privileges 
of sovereignty are the result of the need to balance the rights of sovereign 
states with the greater need for universal peace. The development of 
international humanitarian law “accelerated the reconceptualization of 
sovereignty to transcend the responsibility of the territorial nation-state” and 
placed the rights of the individual on the international plane120. International 
humanitarian law has marked “the point at which sovereignty gives way to 
the prerogatives of the international community” and the prosecution of 
crimes in violation of such norms serves as an affirmation of the supremacy of 
a higher positive law121. According to international human rights theorist 
Nigel Rodley, this higher positive law has served as the basis for the 
recognition and identification of duties for those who exercise power: the 
necessity of respecting, at least to a minimal extent, the dignity of those 
subject to that power122.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The reconfiguration of the concept of state sovereignty and 
humanitarian intervention reached its culmination in the Responsibility to 
Protect Doctrine. The idea emerged as part of the international legal lexicon 
on the cusp of the 21st century, when Francis Deng’s analysis of conflict 
management in Africa argued for a redefinition of sovereignty as “the 
responsibility to protect the people in a given territory”123. This duty to 
protect formulation of sovereignty was elaborated on in a report by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty of August 
2001. “There is no transfer or dilution of state sovereignty”, the report insists. 
“But there is a necessary recharacterization involved: from sovereignty as 
control to sovereignty as responsibility”124. In this way, sovereignty is not 
eroded but instead becomes a necessary condition for maintaining the 
legitimacy of the state125.  
The debate about sovereignty in respect to the R2P principle has been 
directly linked to the events of the Balkan conflict and the international 
community’s response to the worsening humanitarian crisis. Kofi Annan 
drew a direct link between the recharacterization of humanitarian 
intervention and the events at Srebrenica in 1995 when he posed the question 
“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to Srebrenica?”126. Additionally, the 
“legitimate but illegal”127 NATO bombing and subsequent intervention in 
Kosovo has caused a shift in commentary and political concern, away from a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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more general prevention of state breakdown to a specific debate over 
establishing legitimate grounds for military intervention128. The question 
moving forward is where to set the threshold for intervention, to prevent 
unnecessary military action yet encourage the international community to 
uphold its responsibilities.  
Historian Donald Bloxham sees the existence of institutions such as the 
ICTY as “testament to the fact that an organised international value 
community of some sort does exist beyond the international power system 
constituted by the world’s most powerful states”129. Yet, he warns against 
seeing the eventual decisive action of the UN in regards to the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia as heralding the existence of a new norm of humanitarian 
action. Bloxham particularly questions the potential efficacy of the 
international community’s response to conflicts “where their interests are 
antipathetic”130. Despite the evolution of thinking in regards to traditional 
notions of state sovereignty, “events simultaneously illustrated that 
intervention [in the Balkan conflict] was the exception rather than the rule”131.  
In academic thinking today, state sovereignty is a double-edged sword. 
Along with the rights that the traditional concept of Westphalian sovereignty 
instills, there are responsibilities of the state to their subjects. Respect for 
sovereignty is thus “contingent upon a state fulfilling its responsibilities to its 
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citizens”132. Once a right conferred de jure, sovereignty is now conditional, 
and control of territory is seen as “less meaningful than care for life-
sustaining standards for a nation’s inhabitants”133. The focus has shifted from 
the traditional concepts of land and territory to the more modern concepts of 
citizenry and the individual. Respect for state sovereignty is still a vital 
concern, yet it is no longer infallible: the protections provided by state 
sovereignty can be superseded, but only in “the most exceptional and 
extraordinary circumstances”134.  
When blatant disregard for the rights of citizens can be proven, as in 
the Balkan conflict of the 1990s, the international community is forced to act 
decisively. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the international community 
chose to act in three distinct ways: through the positioning of UN 
peacekeeping troops, through military intervention, and through the creation 
of an international criminal tribunal to prosecute violators of international 
law. It is to this third mode of operation that we will now turn.  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia  
The decision to invoke the norm of justice as a means of resolving the 
Yugoslav conflict was “in large part a response to the initial failure of other 
approaches” such as appeasement, economic and diplomatic inducements, 
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and the use of UN peacekeepers135. The concept of invoking an international 
criminal tribunal as an alternative to the comprehensive use of force has been 
criticized by some. The UN Ambassador for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Mohamed Sacirbey believes that “justice was held out, in reality, as an 
alternative to real immediate measures to confront the crime or the 
criminals”136. For various reasons, that are beyond the scope of this thesis, 
there was a lack of international political momentum to commit troops to a 
conflict in the region in the early 1990s. Yet, as further information leaked to 
the international public about the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the Balkan 
region there was growing pressure on governments to respond.  
As an initial gesture of intent, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
764 on July 13th 1992, which stated that persons who commit violations of 
“international humanitarian law” in the former Yugoslavia would be held 
individually responsible for their actions. This was the first step in adding the 
norm of justice to the tools of the peace builders in the Balkan region. 
Additionally, this Resolution served to build upon the lessons of Nuremberg 
and the dangers of action without the requisite legal backing. There could be 
no question that this application of justice would be retroactive.  
With no noticeable heed paid to Security Council warnings, in October 
of 1992 the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 780, which established 
an impartial commission of experts to assess the information submitted 
pursuant to Resolution 771, which had called on participatory nations for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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submission of “substantiated information” concerning war crimes in the 
former Yugoslavia137.  The War Crimes Commission found and reported on 
evidence of “900 prison camps, about 90 paramilitary groups, 1,600 reports of 
rape and 150 mass graves” in its relatively small-scale investigation138.  
The War Crimes Commission’s interim report, released on 26 January 
1993, determined that ‘ethnic cleansing’ had been carried out139.  The 
Commission thus concluded that the policy and practices of ethnic cleansing 
constituted “crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva 
conventions and the crime of genocide”140. It is from this characterization of 
the conflict that some historians, including Williams and Scharf, see that the 
obligation of members of the Security Council to intervene was triggered. As 
parties to the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention, members 
were under a legal obligation to prosecute those who defied the terms of these 
Conventions: “The obligation to prosecute is absolute,” argue historians 
Williams and Scharf, “meaning that state parties can under no circumstances 
grant perpetrators immunity or amnesty from prosecution”141.  
While some members of the UN favoured “less invasive accountability 
measures” to achieve reparation, documentation and punishment without 
jeopardizing the waning peace process, the legal obligation for criminal 
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justice was absolute. In addition, the historical burden of a shockingly similar 
event weighed heavy on the hearts and minds of both politician and civilian 
alike. Lawrence Eagleburger, US Secretary of State, drew upon this historical 
parallel at the Geneva Peace Talks in 1992. He invoked “a moral and historical 
obligation not to stand back a second time in this century while a people faces 
obliteration” and called specifically for charges to be made against certain 
individuals for crimes against humanity142.   
On February 22nd 1993, the Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 808 which established an international tribunal “for the 
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991”143.  
In drafting the statute of the ICTY, preexisting international law 
concerning the commission of war crimes and acts of genocide played a 
crucial role144. “Modeled loosely on the Nuremberg Charter”, according to 
Williams and Scharf, “the proposed statute provided for criminal liability of 
persons who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in violations of international humanitarian law”145. The UN Legal 
Office’s statute provided for jurisdiction over four different international 
crimes, drawn from the widely ratified treaties that established what 
constituted an impermissible act during times of war: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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1. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949  
2. Violations of the laws or customs of war 
3. Genocide 
4. Crimes against humanity 
 
The creation of the ICTY with the jurisdiction to prosecute individual 
criminal responsibility for the above four counts was the result of a decision 
to invoke existing legal power and authority of the Security Council in an 
unprecedented manner146. Article 41 of the UN Charter directly empowers the 
Security Council to use “measures not involving the use of armed force”147. 
Despite the listed nonmilitary measures not including judicial measures, there 
is nothing within the Charter that prevents this method from being legally 
implemented148. The ICTY symbolizes the unique creation of a judicial 
institution with a political mandate, the restoration and maintenance of 
international peace and security.   
For the first time, parties not directly involved in the conflict in 
question were the architects of the trial. The international community stood 
“as neither victor nor victim” and presented a vehicle for the achievement of 
justice that was unaffected by direct involvement in the conflict149. With 
criticisms of the Nuremberg Tribunal as being nothing more than ‘victor’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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justice’ lodged firmly in the back of their minds, the architects of the ICTY 
were determined that this time fair and due process would prevail. As US 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright maintained, the Tribunal was unique in 
its creation; “This will be no victor’s tribunal,” Albright stated at the Security 
Council passing of Resolution 808. “The only victor that will prevail in this 
endeavour is the truth”150.   
The legal framework for the Security Council decision had existed 
since the inception of the UN Charter agreed at the San Francisco Conference 
in 1945. The change that facilitated the creation of the ICTY was in the 
reinterpretation of existing powers and responsibilities of the Security 
Council made possible by the existence of sufficient political will151. Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter allows for “action with respect to threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression”152, but never before had the 
Security Council deemed a conflict occurring within the borders of a single 
sovereign state as a threat that required international intervention in the form 
of a criminal tribunal. In addition, this was the first historical instance where a 
war crimes tribunal had been established in the middle of the armed conflict 
it was tasked to investigate153. In this way the international community was 
forced to walk the tightrope of justice and warfare simultaneously.  
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Precedents set by the ICTY  
International criminal tribunals are one of the mechanisms through 
which sovereign conduct is held accountable to international norms, norms 
that find their basis in the conventions and agreements which nations consent 
to upon signing (many of which were discussed in Chapter One). According 
to Antonio Cassese, the first President of the ICTY, one of the main roles of 
the tribunal has been in clarifying some of the major elements of international 
substantive criminal law and the validity of international criminal tribunals 
more generally154.  
As the first ad hoc international tribunal and the first criminal tribunal 
to prosecute war crimes since Nuremberg, the ICTY has played a definitive 
role. Commentators view the ICTY statute as defining the “features of armed 
conflict” in the modern age, as well as the “conditions on which one may hold 
that an international armed conflict has broken out”155. Fundamentally, the 
successful completion of prosecutorial processes against war criminals has 
reinforced the efficacy of international criminal law and the methodology of 
the international tribunal as a means of bringing about accountability and 
justice.  
While the ICTY has been productive in further grounding a number of 
the core principles that emerged as a result of the Nuremberg Tribunal, that is 
by no means the limitations of its effectiveness. Through the prosecutorial 
process and case law that has emerged as a result of the ICTY, there is a 
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greater clarification of the notion of war crimes as contained in the ICTY 
statute. In particular, the notion of grave breaches of the Geneva Convention, 
subjective elements of crimes against humanity, the notion of joint criminal 
enterprise and the important aspects of genocide have all been clarified and 
codified within international law as a result of ICTY proceedings. 
 
a) The Validity of the ICTY Statute 
It was fundamentally important that the legal basis of the ICTY was 
clear and defined, to avoid charges of retroactive justice as had been leveled 
at the Nuremberg Tribunal. The validity of the ICTY statute was challenged 
and dismissed at both the Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber levels by the 
legal team of Du!ko Tadi!, the first successfully detained indictee of the 
Tribunal.  
Du!ko Tadi! had lived in Kozarac, a predominately Muslim area that 
was of strategic importance to the Serbs since it straddled the corridor 
between Serb-occupied areas of Bosnia and Croatia. When a majority of 
Kozarac’s Muslim residents were executed and the rest were sent to 
concentration camps, Tadi! became a frequent camp ‘visitor’ whose brutality 
made him well known throughout the area. After emigrating to Germany 
Tadi! was arrested by German authorities on suspicion of “murder, aiding 
and abetting genocide, and causing grievous bodily harm”156. Lead 
prosecutor Richard Goldstone requested his transferal back to the Hague and 
the deference of his prosecution to the ICTY, where Tadi! was formally !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 Scharf, M.P. Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial Since 
Nuremberg (North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1997), p.97 
! &&!
indicted on February 13 1995 for 34 counts of breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, violations of the laws and customs of war, and crimes against 
humanity157.   
Legal historian Geoffrey Robertson identifies and analyses the main 
elements of the arguments in the pre-trial motions put forward by Tadi!’s 
legal team. The motion was formed on the grounds that Article III of the ICTY 
Statute was based on war crimes committed during international armed 
conflict, and that the Balkan situation was purely internal158. The Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY dismissed this definition, finding that “an armed 
conflict exists whenever there is resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised 
armed groups”159. Of most vital importance was the Appeals Chamber 
confirmation that an appeal grounded in the language of state sovereignty 
was no longer of relevance, as “a state-sovereignty oriented approach has 
been gradually supplanted by a human-being oriented approach”160.  
The concern of the international community was to protect civilians 
from belligerent violence, whether caused by interstate or civil wars. The 
Tadi! Precedent has thus “rid the law of the anachronistic distinction between 
acts of internal oppression and international conflicts”, allowing for 
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international intervention in instances where the State acts as an internal 
oppressor as well as an external aggressor161.  
Michail Wladimiroff and Alfons Orie, Dusko Tadi! s legal counsel, 
made history as the first to openly question the legality of the Tribunal on the 
grounds of a violation of state sovereignty. The legal team argued that the 
transferal of Tadi! and the deference of the prosecution for his crimes from 
his place of arrest in Germany to the Hague was essentially unlawful 
“because among the sovereign powers retained by UN members is the right 
to prosecute in their own courts”162. While not denying that the principles of 
sovereignty did support such a claim, the Trials Chamber dismissed the 
argument on the grounds that Tadi! had no standing to bring such as issue 
forward: he was neither a German national nor a representative of the 
German state in any way.  
When the same argument was brought to bear in the Appeals 
Chamber, the conclusion was reached that although state sovereignty had a 
role to play, it was not definitive. “State sovereignty must give way,” the 
judgement stated, “in cases where the nature of the offenses alleged does not 
affect the interests of one state alone but shocks the very conscience of 
mankind”163. The creation of the ICTY amounted to abdication of sovereignty 
in the area of criminal jurisdiction, as illustrated in the case of Du!ko Tadi!, 
where international peace and security was threatened164.  
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b) Ending Impunity  
The echoes of Nuremberg are evident in many of the foundational 
elements of the ICTY, not least the Tribunal’s efforts to ground itself in 
existing international law and custom. Despite the fact that traditional 
international law recognises degrees of immunity from criminal prosecution 
for heads of State and other officials, such immunity was denied at 
Nuremberg and codified in Article IV of the Geneva Convention: “Persons 
committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated shall be punished, 
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private 
individuals”165. This practice has continued in the ICTY, despite early 
criticisms that it would hinder the dwindling peace process.  
Furthermore, the ICTY Statute excludes entirely the defence of 
following superior orders, a challenge that was frequently brought about and 
dismissed at the Nuremberg Tribunal. “The fact that an accused person acted 
pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior”, Article VII of the 
Statute denotes, “shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility”166. 
Additionally, the defence of tu quoque, which proved so controversial at the 
Nuremberg Tribunals, has since been deemed “inapplicable to international 
humanitarian law which creates obligations erga omnes167. The ICTY 
specifically holds that evidence that another party to a conflict may also have 
committed atrocities “is, as such irrelevant, because it does not tend to prove !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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or disprove any of the allegations made in the indictment against the 
accused”168.   
 
c) Clarification of War Crimes 
Geoffrey Robertson sees one of the most notable achievements of the 
ICTY as being the identification and stigmatization of rape as a war crime169. 
Since its inception, the ICTY has charged more than seventy individuals with 
crimes of sexual violence and has strengthened the realm of gender crimes in 
international humanitarian law.  
The first case at the ICTY that was focused solely on charges of sexual 
violence was against Anto Furund"ija, commander of the Jokers, a special unit 
of the Croatian Defence unit based in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Charged with 
aiding and abetting the rape of Bosnian women in front of a “laughing 
audience” of other soldiers, the Trial Chamber made important remarks on 
the qualification of rape in the context of international crimes170. While the 
Tribunal’s Statute only makes explicit reference to rape as constituting a crime 
against humanity, the Furund"ija case broadened this scope to ensure that 
rape could be prosecuted as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, as a 
violation of the laws and customs of war, and as a tool of genocide “if the 
requisite elements are met”.  
The Trial Chamber of the ICTY has set precedents that allow for the 
future prosecution of sexual violence as a form of torture and as a precursor !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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to ethnic-cleansing and genocide. In the trial of Hazim Deli!, deputy camp 
commander at the #elebi!i prison camp in central Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
rape was qualified as a form of torture for the first time in an international 
criminal tribunal171. In the judgement of 1998 the judges noted that the 
purpose of the rapes was to obtain information, to intimidate and to coerce: 
“There can be no question that acts of rape may constitute torture under 
customary international law”172. The Trial Chamber roundly condemned the 
use of rape as a method of warfare, highlighting its use as a punishment and 
discriminatory act against women “which strikes at the very core of human 
dignity and physical integrity”173.  
 
d) The Crime of Genocide 
Until as late as 1995 when the ICTY issued its first indictments, no 
international forum had ever prosecuted an individual or group for breach of 
the Genocide Convention, despite genocide having illegal status in 
international criminal law174. The crime of genocide has a significantly higher 
threshold of proof than other violations of international criminal law such as 
crimes against humanity or war crimes. The ICTY holds that genocide “must 
be consciously desired, not simply negligently caused or recklessly risked”175. 
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To successfully charge an indictee with the crime of genocide, the ICTY must 
successfully prove that the genocidal acts were the direct and planned 
consequence of conscious policy decisions, rather than merely a by-product of 
war.  
The first trial of a genocide charge for actions at the Luka concentration 
camp led to an acquittal in December 1999. The judges were “unsatisfied with 
evidence that there had been any organised genocide” although they did not 
definitively state that genocide, by its strictest definition, had not occurred176. 
In August 2001, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY handed down its first 
genocide conviction in the landmark case against Radislav Krsti! for his role 
in the mass murder at Srebrenica177.   
Given this extensive burden of proof, only 8 indictments of genocide 
have reached the trial stage178. Commentators have viewed this as a limitation 
on the efficacy of the Tribunal, as cases where genocidal activity occurred but 
the intent could not be sufficiently proven have been dismissed. The crime of 
genocide was conspicuous in its absence from the indictment of Du!ko Tadi!. 
Despite it being proven that his actions contributed to “the removal of the 
majority of the Muslim population of Prijedor and effectively the destruction 
of that community”179 and were therefore genocidal in their outcome, the 
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Tribunal were “not at all clear that his actions were intended to further the 
Serb policy of ethnic cleansing or were merely a by-product of it”180.   
 
e) Ethnic Cleansing 
The campaign of ethnic cleansing in parts of the former Yugoslavia 
quickly became infamous throughout the world, and is now widely agreed as 
the “involuntary and forced transfer of an ethnically distinct component of a 
population outside their area of former residence by an invading or 
occupying power”181. The term ethnic cleansing first appeared in 1981 in 
Yugoslav media accounts of the establishment of ‘ethnically-clean territories’ 
in Kosovo182. The term then entered international legal vocabulary in 1992 
when it was used to describe the policies openly pursued by the various 
parties to the Yugoslav conflict that aimed to create ethnically homogenous 
territories183. It is important to note that the phrase does not appear in the 
Statute of the ICTY and has “never been authoritatively defined in 
international law”, despite being used as a descriptive term in later 
hearings184.  
One notable feature of the inclusion of the term ethnic cleansing in the 
Judgements of the ICTY is that until the 1970s, “legally constituted mass 
population transfers seemed… in no way criminal or genocidal”185. The 
transfer of ethnic minorities out of territories was seen as a means of reducing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the potential source of conflict and providing “long-term humanitarian 
solutions” in ethnically defined nation-states186. It was not until the War of the 
Yugoslav Succession that ethnic cleansing was widely “attacked and 
demonized by international humanitarian bodies”187.  
The Commission of Experts appointed by the Security Council adopted 
the phrase, determining that a policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ constituted a crime 
against humanity, a war crime, and could be seen as a breach of the Genocide 
Convention188. The official definition of ethnic cleansing as adopted by the 
ICTY was first put on the record in the Rule 61 hearing of Karad"i! and Mladi!: 
“Ethnic cleansing is a practice which means that you act in such a way that in 
a given territory the members of a given ethnic group are eliminated”189. The 
response of the international community in regards to the ethnic-cleansing 
policies in the former Yugoslavia are demonstrative of a dramatic shift in 
attitudes in regards to the large-scale transferal of minority populations.  
 
Case Study: Slobodan Milo!evi!  
The three indictments against Slobodan Milo!evi!, the President of 
Serbia from 1987 to 1999 and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
from 1997 to 2000, charge him with all four categories of offenses as listed in 
the ICTY statute. The trial of Milo!evi! thus makes an effective case study for 
the purpose of examining the precedents set by the Tribunal. Yet it is 
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important to note that due to his death before the proceedings concluded, no 
official verdict was ever returned190.  
The information drawn from these proceedings is thus based on the 
indictments, witness testimony and cross-examination. Drawing on the 
historical background of the Yugoslav Conflict, lead prosecutor Louise 
Arbour used the indictments to summarise Milo!evi!’s “campaign of terror 
and violence” with the alleged purpose to facilitate the “consolidation of Serb 
control over Kosovo and parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
eventually to be incorporated into a ‘Greater Serbia’”191. Milo!evi! was 
transferred to the custody of the ICTY on June 29 2001 but died before the 
trial had concluded on March 11 2006.  
Milo!evi! was charged with Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention 
(Article II of the ICTY Statute) for actions in both Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The eight specific acts that are categorised as Grave Breaches 
are drawn from four international treaties, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
which deal with the laws of armed conflict192. The Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal set the precedent for the codification of war crimes, focusing on 
crimes committed by or against combatants. The Geneva Conventions, and 
thus the charge of Grave Breaches by the ICTY, focuses on non-combatants, 
specifically civilians and hors de combat193 who were those affected in greatest 
numbers in the Balkan conflict194.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Milo!evi! was notably not charged with Grave Breaches in regards to 
his actions in Kosovo. The charge was “deemed inappropriate with respect to 
actions by Yugoslav forces against the Kosovo Albanian minority within the 
borders of the sovereign state of Yugoslavia”195. Thus the charge for Grave 
Breaches is only applicable in international, not internal, armed conflicts. 
Milo!evi! was brought to account for his actions in Kosovo until Article III of 
the ICTY Statute, the charge of Violations of Laws or Customs of War. The 
five acts specified in the Statute are drawn largely from the Nuremberg 
Precedents, and encompass a range of acts that may be committed during 
armed conflict. Since this article applies to both non-international armed 
conflict and international armed conflict, the Kosovo crisis falls under this 
category.  
 The definition and applicability of the crimes listed in the ICTY Statute 
were in many ways confined by the constraints of existing international law. 
The Tribunal had to adapt and reconfigure the contemporary framework of 
humanitarian and criminal law to form indictments that could be applied and 
proven beyond reasonable doubt in regards to those brought into its custody. 
It was in this redefinition and reinterpretation that the ICTY set new 
precedents in the realm of international humanitarian and criminal law.  
The initial indictments issued against Milo!evi! in 1999 did not charge 
him with the crime of genocide. However, the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
indictment was adapted in 2001 to include a specific reference to Srebrenica, 
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for which there was now an important precedent in the form of the guilty 
verdict found in the Krsti! case. In the Milo!evi! case, he would be tried on 
the grounds of command responsibility and de jure196 authority over a range 
of military and civilian institutions that played a role in the Srebrenica 
massacre. This was the first command responsibility trial since the US 
military commission of the Japanese commander General Yamashita 
following World War Two. Under this principle, even if the crime had been 
physically committed by a subordinate, the prosecution only had to prove 
that Milo!evi!, as the superior commander, had reason to know that the crime 
would be committed or had failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
measures to prevent it197.  
While not being held physically responsible for the war crimes 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, Milo!evi! was 
highlighted by the lead prosecutor Carla Del Ponte as the integral link in a 
joint criminal enterprise that had ordered and perpetrated those crimes198.  
The idea of joint criminal enterprise is relatively new in international criminal 
law and the phrasing was adopted for the first time in the 2001 indictment 
against him: “Slobodan Milo!evi! participated in the joint criminal 
enterprise… The purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was the forcible 
removal of the majority of non-Serbs… from large areas of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”199.  
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These charges are conditional on proving the existence of a common 
enterprise to create ethnically homogenous territories200. Any individual who 
participates physically in a crime; is present when a crime is committed; 
encouraged another to commit the crime; or commits an act in furtherance of 
this particular system or policy can be found guilty of participation in a joint 
criminal enterprise. By virtue of the dominant position held by Milo!evi! 
throughout the political and military structures of what remained of 
Yugoslavia, the joint criminal enterprise element provides a means by which 
all criminal acts carried out by official or quasi-official forces can be linked 
back to him201.  
In the case of Srebrenica, Milo!evi!’s role as President of Serbia and the 
Supreme Defence Council saw him exercise direct authority over Krsti!, 
Mladi! and Karad"i!, and the forces who took over the UN safe zone in July 
1995 and allegedly killed up to 8,000 Bosniaks202. The Prosecutor made it clear 
that Milo!evi! did not physically commit the murders with which he was 
charged, but that his actions evidenced the necessary intent which coupled 
with the outcome constituted genocide.  
General’s Krsti! and Mladi! have been identified as the massacre’s 
architects and no reference to any alleged complicity of Milo!evi! was raised 
in the Krsti! case. However, through the application of the concepts of 
command responsibility and joint criminal enterprise, Milo!evi! as the 
commanding head of a joint criminal enterprise, of which Krsti! and Mladi! 
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were central members, could be said to be complicit in the Srebrenica 
atrocity203.  
 
Conclusion 
The convening of the ICTY evidences the way in which the 
international community has applied the precedents of the IMT at 
Nuremberg, as well as attempting to improve, modernize and adapt the 
existing framework.  
International criminal tribunals have become a crucial and prevalent 
legal mechanism of international intervention in instances of state-sponsored 
violence. As a result of evolutionary thinking in the field of state sovereignty 
and the universal responsibility to protect individual rights, international 
criminal tribunals have become a pivotal apparatus in modern day 
international relations. The fact that the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, the Special Courts in Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Lebanon and East 
Timor, and the International Criminal Court are all in existence is testament to 
this growing importance.  
These mechanisms are, however, not without their inherent flaws. 
While some of the issues of their legal validity have already been addressed, 
their very existence is not the only contentious issue. Recently, attention has 
turned to the interplay and growing interconnectedness of the fields of law 
and history. 
 As we have established, as well as being a means of achieving justice, 
international criminal tribunals have from time to time chosen to adopt a fact 
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or truth-finding operation. In addition to this truth finding obligation, the 
facts established in a criminal trial will inevitably impact the public record of 
the event. It is the issue regarding the transposition of information obtained 
for the purpose of a legal mechanism to use in the forum of history writing 
that will be explored and analysed in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Three 
History and the ICTY: A Controversial Legacy  
 
In nations riven by the devastation of mass atrocity, the mechanism of 
an international criminal tribunal is often adopted as the chosen method of 
post-conflict resolution. This thesis has engaged with the implementation of 
an international criminal tribunal in the wake of World War Two and in the 
midst of the Balkan conflict, illustrating the ways in which the framework of a 
criminal tribunal has been adapted to and reflective of greater trends in 
academic and political thinking in regards to the pursuit of justice.  
In continued exploration, this chapter analyses the ICTY as a means of 
establishing a historical record as a mode of post-conflict resolution. The 
pursuit of truth and fact finding as a societal response to collective violence is 
therefore the focus of this chapter, in an effort to expand upon the ideas put 
forward by Martha Minow. 
 Using specific examples from the mandate and procedures of the 
ICTY, this chapter argues that despite a conscious attempt to establish an 
accurate historical record as a means of facilitating reconciliation between 
victims and society more broadly, the history written as a result of the ICTY is 
inherently flawed. While the international criminal tribunal at Nuremberg 
focused on the maintenance of the balance of power and the early years of the 
ICTY in particular saw an engagement with evolutionary thinking in terms of 
human rights, it is also important to acknowledge the ICTY in its attempts to 
use truth as a mode of reconciliation. Reflective not only of the evolvement of 
! (+!
post-conflict resolution and it’s focus on fact-finding, this change is also 
exemplary of the evolving field of legal history which seeks to examine and 
critique the growing interconnectedness of history in the legal sphere.  
As the proceedings at the ICTY begin to wind down as result of the 
implemented completion strategy, we are drawn to look at the legacy it will 
leave behind. As established in Chapter Two, the ICTY represents the 
evolution of individual rights as a cause for a significant compromise over the 
power of state sovereignty and the use of criminal tribunals as a mechanism 
for achieving justice for the individual and reconciliation for post-conflict 
societies. In addition, the Tribunal at The Hague has provided the framework 
for national and localized criminal tribunals and legal mechanisms to 
continue the process of achieving justice for the victims of the Balkan 
conflicts. The processes of prosecution in domestic courts are another critical 
element of the ICTY’s legacy that will be remembered in posterity.  
However, to limit the impact of the ICTY to the field of law would do it 
a great disservice. It is of the utmost importance to analyse the impression 
that the ICTY has had on the historical record of the events over which it 
holds criminal jurisdiction. The burgeoning field of history which engages 
with the interconnection of the fields of legal and historical thinking, 
highlights the methodological differences between the two; and yet, there is 
an acknowledgement that they are inescapably intertwined and becoming 
ever more so as the mechanisms of international criminal tribunals continue 
to be drawn upon more frequently.  
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While some legal mechanisms merely impact the historical record of 
the events with which they engage in a minor or limited way, the ICTY in 
particular has made a conscious decision to contribute to the field of history 
surrounding the events in the former Yugoslavia. It is therefore a matter of 
acute consequence that the validity and fairness of court testimony is upheld. 
It is this testimony which impacts not only the findings of the court, but the 
findings of history. This chapter attempts to explore this contentious issue 
historiographically, from Hannah Arendt’s vocal warnings as a result of the 
Eichmann Trial to the more modern interpretations of Richard Ashby Wilson.  
Historian Martha Minow has witnessed the growing 
interconnectedness of the fields of law and history and questions the future of 
the two methodologies in concert. As legal mechanisms are increasingly 
called upon to solve the pertinent issues of international relations, the 
assumption is made that it is this material which will progressively form the 
basis of our understanding of the events discussed. This assumption begs the 
question asked by Minow of international criminal tribunals and legal 
mechanisms of this kind: should justice or truth take precedence?   
It is the view of this thesis that without justice there can be no truth (or, 
at the very least, an incomplete and therefore inadequate truth) revealed in a 
courtroom. While the Nuremberg Tribunals were highly criticized for a lack 
of due process, as highlighted in Chapter One, there was hope that 
improvements would be made on the established framework, as analysed in 
Chapter Two. However, the ICTY is exemplary of the dangers that come to 
fruition when respect for just process is diminished through a combination of 
! (#!
political factors and institutional failures. The historical record produced as a 
result of the testimony recorded at the ICTY is therefore limited and 
incomplete.  
I have interviewed two former members of the ICTY legal counsel as a 
means of achieving a more in-depth understanding of how law and history 
are increasingly interconnected within the courtroom setting. The questions 
asked of them were intended to provoke the interviewees into discussing the 
role that historical context more generally played within the trials they were 
involved in, as well as specific questions about institutional factors. The 
answers given played a critical role in developing the ideas addressed in the 
following pages, yet specific accreditation is only given in footnotes for 
quotes and paraphrasing. Mark Ierace SC served as a Senior Trial Attorney 
for the Office of the Prosecutor at the Tribunal, working most specifically on 
the case of Stanislav Gali! which lasted between December of 2001 and May 
of 2003. Chrissa Loukas SC served on the Defence Counsel at the ICTY in the 
case of Mom$ilo Kraji!nik and as Vice President of the Association of the 
Defence Counsel. It is important to note that the ideas put forward were 
equally represented between the Prosecution and Defence as a result of 
having one interviewee from each ‘side of the bar table’. 
It is widely accepted that the ICTY will “be judged by the standards of 
fairness it is able to demonstrate”204. If this is the case, then the legacy of the 
ICTY, like that of the IMT, will be forever tainted and it’s attempt to establish 
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an accurate historical record as a means of post-conflict reconciliation will 
never come to fruition.  
 
Law and History: An Uneasy Marriage? 
There are few who contend with the idea that legal mechanisms are 
effective in their ability to establish facts that have been tested under cross-
examination and the other rigorous processes of the courtroom. As Christine 
van den Wyngaert points out, “through the process of judicial fact finding, 
international criminal courts help to sort out competing accounts”205. As a 
result of this fact-finding use, judges in an international criminal tribunal are 
“acutely aware that their judgement will inevitably be viewed as making 
history”206. While the symbiosis between the fields of law and history in terms 
of legal mechanisms such as international criminal tribunals established as a 
result of major conflicts is widely recognised, there is a similar understanding 
that the relationship between “criminal judgement and historical 
interpretation is problematic in myriad ways”207.  
There are two broad schools of historical thought that maintain the 
argument that courts are “inappropriate venues to delineate the origins and 
causes of mass crimes”208.  
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Liberal legalism claims that the sole function of a criminal trial is to 
determine whether the alleged crimes occurred and, if so, whether the 
defendant can be held criminally responsible for them209. One of the most 
influential historical scholars to adopt this position was Hannah Arendt, who 
strongly argued that the main and only function of a court should be to 
determine the guilt or innocence of an individual: “The purpose of the trial is 
to render justice and nothing else”210. Attempting to pass judgement on 
competing historical interpretations serves to undermine fair procedure and 
due process and place an undue qualification on the universality of the legal 
outcome. In her study of the Eichmann trial, Arendt criticizes the labeling of 
Eichmann’s crimes as specifically crimes against the Jewish people: in her 
eyes the legal process should have construed them as crimes against 
humanity as a whole and not contributed to the debate about the 
historicization of Jewish persecution211.  
Scholars of law-and-society pursue this vein of argument, claiming that 
even when courts attempt historical inquiry, they are bound to fail as a result 
of the inherent limitations of the legal process. Historian Richard Evans is one 
of the proponents of the ‘Incompatibility Theory’, identifying “profound 
incompatibilities between legal and historical approaches to evidence” that 
render legal testimony inappropriate for the articulation of historical fact212. 
Law and history involve different modes of reasoning altogether and while 
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courts seek the certitude which allows them to convict or acquit, historians 
are released from such imperatives213.  
 Donald Bloxham is an innovative thinker within this field, looking at 
the explicit aims of modern legal mechanisms to contribute to the historical 
field. Bloxham points out the successes of the ICTY in establishing “an 
invaluable documentary database about the crimes of that era”214. It is his 
belief that the courtroom is a place for establishing the facts, facts tested 
under the rigorous constraints of criminal legal methodology. Yet he remains 
critical of the aims of the ICTY to consciously establish it’s own historical 
record of the events. He maintains that the primary function of the court is to 
establish a substantiated verdict and mete out punishment where 
appropriate. While the facts established in a courtroom may be of value, the 
“only matter over which the courts have complete control and for which they 
are properly qualified” is to establish criminal responsibility for a specific act.  
As an illustration of these incompatibilities and the modern historian’s 
attempts to overcome them, Mark Osiel tracks the emergence of ‘perpetrator 
history’, a branch focused almost exclusively on the intentions and ideologies 
of top leaders, an emphasis understandable when reflecting on the record of 
legal proceedings. The Nuremberg Tribunal assigned the highest import to 
members of the political and military elite and as a means of achieving 
success in the legal sphere, this methodology had its benefits. However, Osiel 
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these events. By focusing so intently on the actions of the individual, the 
courts missed not only the “macro picture, the story of mass collaboration and 
institutional support for administrative brutality” but also the “micro-picture, 
the story of the victims, the human experience of uncomprehending 
suffering”215.  
In contrast, there are a growing number of modern historians who 
have called for a reevaluation of the interrelationship between the fields of 
law and history. Bob de Graaff views the two disciplines as “condemned to 
cooperation” due to the evolution of the legal field and it’s growing reliance 
on historical evidence216. In addition, de Graaff points to the growing field of 
historical study which seeks to do more than merely “explain, interpret and 
evaluate such inhuman events” by invoking questions of justice.  
Modern legal historian Richard Ashby Wilson sees an evolution in the 
interrelation between law and history, arguing that their relationship “cannot 
be characterised by either harmonious accord or inherent contradiction”217. 
Wilson describes an inescapable connection between the two, in that courts 
provide a body of evidence that is invaluable to historians. Therefore legal 
counsel in their arguments and judges in their final judgements have an 
impact as producers of history long after the culmination of the trial. As the 
methodologies of law and history continue to evolve, Wilson sees a 
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compelling case for rethinking the long-standing view that “the pursuit of 
justice and the writing of history are inherently irreconcilable”218.  
In particular, Wilson points to the ICTY as a point of departure from 
previous courtroom accounts of mass atrocities. As an international tribunal, 
the ICTY has been less influenced by distorted narratives of national identity 
and therefore the historical account it creates has a lessened ethnic bias. In 
addition, the new legal categories such as genocide have compelled the court 
to situate individual acts within long-term systematic policies rather than 
view them as isolated events219. In this way, the very nature of the history that 
can be written as a result of court testimony has been changed and expanded 
beyond the scope of the bare facts of an individual act.  
The ICTY and its pyramidal Prosecutorial structure runs the risk of 
reiterating these same mistakes, and creating a historical record that is 
fundamentally limited by its selectivity. French historian Pierre Nora 
maintained that “history should not concern itself with ascribing praise or 
blame to individuals, but rather with tracking long-term social and 
institutional change”220. It is therefore the role of the historian to take the 
evidence proffered by the court, and dig deeper and look beyond the 
individual or the event in question. In an attempt to engage with and build 
upon the foundations established by the Nuremberg Tribunal, historians of 
the Balkan conflict and the ICTY are seeking to recapture this broader 
perspective. While at Nuremberg there was little testimony by surviving !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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victims, the ICTY has placed a unique focus on oral testimony and “direct 
evidence, people giving evidence of what happened to them”221. As both 
Richard Wilson and Mark Osiel point to in their work, there has been an 
increase in the number of oral histories and the use of this forum to explore 
the “subjective experience” of witnesses and victims, illustrating the 
newfound versatility of direct evidence when transposed to the field of 
history222. 
 
The ICTY and its aim to write history  
Despite widespread debate about the suitability of the courtroom as a 
forum for history writing, it is now broadly accepted that the chain of events 
established in a courtroom, and the evidence used to establish it, will have an 
impact on the historical record of that event. From the time of the Nuremberg 
Trials, the development of an historical record has been a conscious aim of the 
instigators of criminal tribunals, despite the differing epistemological 
methodology of the two fields, and the ICTY is no exception.  
It is therefore of crucial importance to create an awareness of the 
limitations of the legal system in regards to the establishment of a well-
rounded, unbiased and complete history of the events which it seeks to judge.  
It is only through a thorough analysis of the system as it stands that effective 
and meaningful changes can be made.  
As noted by Robert Jackson following the Nuremberg Trials, one of the 
most notable achievements of the IMT was the documentation of Nazi !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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atrocities “with such authenticity and in such detail that there [could] be no 
responsible denial of these crimes”223. It is the furtherance of this credible 
historical account of international crimes that is found at the heart of the aims 
of the ICTY.  
At the time of it’s creation, the permanent members of the Security 
Council articulated six distinct goals, or justifications, for the ICTY: to provide 
justice for the victims, to establish accountability for individual perpetrators, 
to deter continued atrocities in the Balkans, to facilitate the restoration of 
peace, to serve as a deterrent elsewhere around the globe, and to develop an 
historical record of the conflict224. In this way we see a preoccupation not only 
with addressing the crimes themselves, but also with influencing the way 
these crimes and their alleged perpetrators would be remembered.  
At the ICTY, the concepts of law and history are inextricably linked 
and purposefully so. While administering justice through the application of 
legal processes, the Tribunal is conscious that the record it establishes and 
makes public will form the basis for the future understanding of this conflict 
and the actions of the world in it’s aftermath. “This publicly presented 
evidence”, stated Justice Richard Goldstone in Prosecutor v. Nikoli!, will 
constitute a permanent public record for all time of the horrendous war 
crimes that have been committed in the former Yugoslavia”225.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
223 Williams, P.R and Scharf, M.P. Peace with Justice? War Crimes and Accountability in the 
Former Yugoslavia, p.121 
224 Scharf, M.P and Schabas, W.A. Slobodan Milosevic on Trial, p.52 
225 Thieroff, M. and Amley, E.A. “Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in the Balkans: The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rule 61”, Yale Journal of 
International Law (Vol.23: 1998), p.247 
! )+!
The development of an accurate historical record is of particular 
importance in the aftermath of the Balkan conflict, a confrontation in which 
distortion of the truth had been an essential ingredient in the ethnic violence 
perpetrated226. It was through an inflammation of historical tensions and 
dormant rivalries that the nationalist governments of the newly independent 
states of the Former Yugoslavia had fostered active support bases. As noted 
by Mark Ierace, “there were resentments from injustices that were never 
addressed from World War Two that worked actively beneath the surface to 
lead to an eruption of violence this time around”227. In this same vein, it is the 
historical record of this conflict that will have a direct impact on the prospects 
of reconciliation and nation-building for the states of the Former Yugoslavia.  
In post-conflict societies, different versions of the traumatic events 
often compete with one another228. The function of truth finding that is 
associated with legal proceedings helps to create an official narrative of the 
conflict more broadly as well as reconstruct the events of the specific crime 
being investigated, a “properly tested historical record of those horrors”229.  
It is the ICTY’s position as an ad hoc tribunal established by the UN 
rather than the victors of the conflict that enhances its credibility as an 
unprejudiced source of information; although it must be noted that the 
narrative produced by the ICTY is by no means one unquestionably accepted 
by all ethnic groups. Different ethno-national communities are more likely to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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view the truths found by the international tribunal “selectively and on the 
basis of their particular definition of war, defenders and perpetrators”230. 
However, it is hoped that there will be an establishment of largely 
uncontestable facts about the conflict, facts that will be solidified in the court 
of law and therefore unable to be manipulated or twisted in times to come. In 
this way, the historical record as produced by the ICTY has hopes for the 
maintenance of peace in to the future. As Antonio Cassese has noted, “justice 
is an indispensable ingredient of the process of national reconciliation”231. It is 
through learning and understanding the mistakes of the past that society has 
the best chance of preventing their repetition.    
 
History and the ICTY: An Imperfect Relationship  
 The fields of law and history have an increasingly symbiotic yet 
imperfect relationship. A thorough examination of the institutional failures 
embedded within the international criminal tribunal system is essential, as the 
historical record written as a result of any legal proceedings will be inherently 
impacted by the context and limitations of the courtroom. While it must be 
noted that the ICTY’s contribution to historical inquiry into the Balkan 
conflict will be “one of many, the interpretation of events found through 
evidentiary proof will be of particular weight and importance”232. It is thus of 
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the utmost importance to study the shortcomings of the ICTY system in terms 
of procedural fairness, not only for its legacy but the accuracy of the historical 
record it is contributing to. Without due process, there is doubt cast on the 
authority and integrity of the legal proceedings and by extension on the 
record that these proceedings create233.  
  The ICTY serves as an effective example of the limitations of the 
courtroom process as the Tribunal consciously seeks to contribute to the 
historical record of the Balkan conflict. The mechanisms adopted by the ICTY 
are adequately representative of the framework more broadly applied to 
international criminal tribunals and thus provide useful examples to be 
studied. While some examples engaged with apply with specificity to the 
ICTY, for example the controversial implementation of Rule 61, there are 
others that can be applied more broadly to international criminal tribunals in 
general.  
International criminal tribunals are increasingly called upon as the 
legal mechanism of choice to end conflicts and rehabilitate post-conflict 
societies. For this reason, the facts established through the trial process are 
relied upon to solidify the differing opinions regarding the traumatic events. 
Particularly as civil unrest and ethnic conflict within sovereign borders 
becomes more prevalent, the fact-finding mission of the tribunal framework 
plays an increasingly important role in regards to clarification of the truth.   
As the ICTY enters its final phases of work and begins the legal 
proceedings against those last accused perpetrators, attention will turn to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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legacy this Institution will leave, in terms of the crimes it has examined and 
the historical record it has helped produce. Trial Chamber judgements have 
provided modern day academia with what might be called “forensic history”, 
an account derived from witness testimony and documentary evidence 
submitted in each case234. Yet, the failures of a variety of institutional 
mechanisms decrease the validity and reliability of this forensic history.  
In January-February 1994, the ICTY Judges institutionalised a set of 
Rules and Procedures of Evidence (RPE) that aimed to regulate court 
proceedings235. Judges have continuously adapted the Rules and Procedures 
to meet the specific requirements of international trials and it is this body of 
procedural and evidentiary rules that will be one of the main contributions of 
the ICTY to international criminal law; while simultaneously attracting the 
harshest criticism236. 
There are elements of the RPE that negatively impact the validity of the 
historical record created as a result of the ICTY’s prosecutorial proceedings. 
As noted by interviewee Chrissa Loukas, the legacy of the ICTY will be 
judged on the basis of fairness: “The tribunal will not be judged on the 
number of convictions which it enters but the fairness of the trials”237. In the 
absence of procedural fairness, the validity of the evidence found at trial can 
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still be questioned and thus the historical record created as a result of it may 
be discredited.  
 
a) Genocide and dolus specialis  
The role of historical context in the legal domain has changed and 
evolved over time, and has gradually become of more importance. In the 
specific setting of an international criminal tribunal, the impact of historical 
context has drastically increased with the establishment of genocide as a 
crime. It is apparent that prosecutors are “more likely to turn to historical 
evidence” in order to illustrate the mental state of the accused238.  
For genocidal intent or dolus specialis to be established and therefore for 
the alleged perpetrator to be found guilty of genocide, premeditation and a 
conscious desire to commit genocide must be proven. However, proof of 
intent to commit genocide does not necessarily require a confession of motive, 
as a court may “infer proof of the intent to destroy a group, in whole or in 
part, from a pattern of actions to that effect”239. As delineated by the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber in the case of Prosecutor vs Jelisi! proof of specific intent 
“may, in the absence of direct explicit evidence, be inferred from a number of 
facts and circumstances, such as general context, the perpetration of other 
culpable acts, the systematic targeting of victims or the repetition of 
destructive or discriminatory acts”240. In an attempt to illustrate the necessary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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intent, the Prosecution will evaluate the historical context and attempt to 
establish the necessary intent through the presentation of contextual evidence.  
Historical contextualization has assumed greater prominence in trials 
to determine individual criminal responsibility because it “responds to the 
requirements of a new class of legal concepts… that demand proof of 
discriminatory intent to harm a group”241. Richard Wilson sees historical 
context as central to the Milo!evi! trial, where the high threshold of proving 
special intent to commit genocide meant that Prosecutors were forced to draw 
on historical evidence. Dr Audrey Helfant Budding was called forward as the 
historical expert for the Prosecution and a majority of her testimony was in 
furtherance of the argument that the Serbian genocide was “the culmination 
of a century-old ideological program”242. The Prosecution drew on historical 
evidence in an attempt to prove the necessary mental elements of the crime of 
genocide.  
While historical evidence can be a useful tool for the Prosecution to 
effectively prove the crimes put forward in the indictment against an 
individual perpetrator, the converse lack of necessary evidence can prevent 
the securing of a guilty verdict. In the case of Du!ko Tadi!, the crimes he was 
accused of committing were largely supported by eyewitness testimony and 
positive identification at the scene. However, for those crimes to be 
considered genocidal, the court had to be convinced that these individual 
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crimes were part of a wider program or policy of persecution243. When the 
Prosecution failed to satisfy the Judge’s requirements to establish a wider 
program and the necessary criminal intent, Tadi!’s crimes were downgraded 
from genocide to the lesser charge of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and violations of the laws and customs of war244.  
To extrapolate further on the idea of the importance of historical 
context, the very jurisdiction of the Tribunal over a majority of the accused 
crimes rests on a question of historical interpretation245. The role of historical 
context was crucial to the indictment and prosecution of Slobodan Milo!evi!. 
Without establishing that the declaration of independence of the states of 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia occurred in June of 
1991 and February of 1992 respectively, there would have been no 
international crime for Milo!evi! to answer to.  
  
b) Rule 61  
The “Procedure in Case of Failure to Execute a Warrant”, adopted into 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as Rule 61, provides a means by which 
the judge can confirm the indictment of a defendant and submit it to the Trial 
Chamber. The existence of Rule 61 allows for information and testimony 
untested in a court of law to be freely entered on to the public record. Once 
the indictment is submitted, the Prosecutor may introduce evidence and call 
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and examine witnesses246. If the Judges see that there are “reasonable grounds 
for believing that the accused has committed all or any of the crimes charged 
in the indictment” then the Prosecutor will read the indictment aloud in open 
court247. In addition, the Trial Chamber shall also issue an international arrest 
warrant for the accused.  
Rule 61 was devised in order to ensure that the Tribunal was not 
rendered ineffective if it was unable to gain custody of the accused, a very 
real issue in 1994 when the conflict was ongoing and the cooperation of all 
States was not assured248. The adoption of Rule 61 gave the Tribunal the 
power to provide a hearing in an open court of the evidence that was 
submitted to the judge when the indictment was confirmed. This hearing 
process was conceived as an alternative to the trial in absentia and as a means 
of moving forward with the indictment in the absence of the requisite state 
cooperation to obtain custody of the accused249. However, despite these 
positive intentions, the reality of Rule 61 has resulted in “a legal aberration 
and a substitute that satisfies no one”250. The legal and political imperatives of 
the Tribunal are not always coincidental and therefore a balance must be 
reached between the two251: Rule 61 hearings are an example of political 
imperatives taking precedence over legal due process.  
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Rule 61 hearings have been roundly criticized by lawyer Geoffrey 
Robertson as an outright reversal of the presumption of innocence promised 
by Article 21(3) of the ICTY Statute and by historian Aleksandra Stankovic as 
a blatant dismissal of the right of the accused to be present during his trial as 
affirmed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights252. As the 
Rule 61 proceedings happen in an open court, the indicted suspect will be 
“publicly prejudged prior to his trial, by three judges of the court and by the 
media”253. While the Tribunal maintains that Rule 61 is not a trial in absentia 
because there is “no finding of guilt”, Robertson criticizes the hearings as 
overlooking the fact that “there is a determination of likely guilt by way of a 
finding of reasonable grounds for judicial belief that the accused has 
committed a crime for which he has been indicted”254.  
By putting the prosecution’s evidence, unchallenged, in to the public 
domain, Rule 61 severely impacts the historical record of the Balkan conflict: 
“The perpetrator’s actions are publicized for eternity”255. The most infamous 
Rule 61 hearing was that of Prosecutor v. Karad"i! and Mladi! which began on 
June 27 1996, a case in which the two defendants were accused of crimes 
against humanity and genocide. In the eyes of Geoffrey Robertson, this 
hearing “lacked even the appearance of justice”256. No argument from the 
defence was put forward and the court allowed no cross-examination of 
victim or witness testimony. The lawyers of the accused were ordered to sit in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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the public gallery while “prejudicial evidence” against their clients was read 
on to the public record “without challenge” and a ruling of presumptive guilt 
for crimes against humanity was delivered.  
At the conclusion of a Rule 61 hearing, the indictment, and the verdict 
of presumptive guilt, is broadcast around the world “with the intent of 
creating greater urgency for the apprehension of the accused”257. While being 
specifically intended to deal with uncooperative States the information 
swiftly enters the public domain. As Chrissa Loukas notes, the outcome of a 
Rule 61 hearing is the danger of “placing something on the public record that 
has not been tested”258. And yet, this is not merely an unavoidable by-product 
of media attention but one of the aims of Rule 61 proceedings.  
As noted by Judge Rustam Sidhwa, the ICTY is presenting these 
hearings as “the next effective procedure to inform the world of the terrible 
crimes with which the accused is charged and the evidence against the 
accused that would support his conviction at trial”259. In the same vein, Justice 
Goldstone has praised the adoption of Rule 61. “A Rule 61 hearing will 
constitute a permanent judicial record for all time,” Goldstone has stated. 
“That public record will assist in attributing guilt to individuals”260. Yet to 
label the information retained in a Rule 61 hearing as a “record of the crimes” 
is to give uncontested allegations undue status. This record is created without 
input from the defence, and thus remains inherently biased.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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c) Unreliable Evidence: Hearsay and Hidden Identities  
Hearsay evidence is deemed of no value to countries who adopt the 
common law system, as the demeanor of the originator of a piece of 
information cannot be tested, nor can the information be taken under oath or 
subject to cross-examination261. In contrast, international criminal tribunals, 
including the ICTY, operate without an explicit rule against the admissibility 
of hearsay evidence262: Rule 89 of the RPE allows a Trial Chamber to admit 
“any relevant evidence, including hearsay, which it deems to have probative 
value”263.  
A fundamental right or guarantee of the international legal system is 
that of cross-examination of witness testimony. Loukas maintains that “if you 
want something to be correct in law and also correct historically, you have to 
be able to test the allegations”264. However, the adaptation of Rule 92bis 
interferes with this basic safeguard. Its application allows for the Chamber to 
“admit witness statements and transcripts from previous trials while denying, 
in certain circumstances, the opposing party’s right to cross-examine”265. The 
opportunity to cross-examine the information will be denied if the court is 
satisfied that the witness was subject to cross-examination at an earlier stage 
and that the document was prepared for use in legal proceedings. Yet, the 
nature of the information portrayed in a legal document does not make it 
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infallible. As Loukas noted when interviewed, “just because something was 
said in a courtroom doesn’t mean it is the truth”266.  
As noted by human rights academic Eric Stover, “witnesses are the 
lifeblood of the ICTY trials” because the political and military commanders in 
the former Yugoslavia did not keep meticulous records of their deeds267. 
Thus, victim and eyewitness testimonies form the ballast of most of the 
prosecution’s cases and it is this same testimony that has been the basis of 
much debate surrounding the rules and procedures of the ICTY. While it is 
the responsibility of the Tribunal to protect the safety and wellbeing of 
witnesses who testify in the court, these protective measures “must always be 
balanced against the rights of the accused to a fair and public trial”268. 
However, certain elements of the RPE strongly compromise these 
fundamental rights.  
Rule 75 of the RPE allows the court to order the expunging of names 
from the tribunal record; the nondisclosure to the public of any records 
identifying the witness; testimony via voice or image altering devices or 
closed circuit television; and/or the assignment of a pseudonym where 
deemed applicable for the safeguarding of the witness269. In addition, Rule 79 
of the RPE allows for the Tribunal to call for a closed session in which the 
court may part the press and public from the proceedings270. Finally, Rule 96 
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governs the testimony of victims of sexual violence, requiring “no 
corroboration of the victim’s testimony”; meaning that an accused perpetrator 
can be convicted on the strength of a single eyewitness or victim account271.  
While the need for adequate assurances of safety are obviously 
required, these protective measures negatively impact the ability of the 
accused’s counsel to mount an effective counter-argument against the 
indictment. The basic principle of criminal law is that every person accused of 
a crime has a right to know who is appearing as a witness and to cross-
examine them272. The decision to allow anonymous witnesses has been 
criticized by Australian jurist Sir Ninian Stephen. “If the defence is unaware 
of the identity of the person it seeks to question”, Stephen maintains, “it may 
be deprived of the very particulars enabling it to demonstrate that he or she is 
prejudiced, hostile or unreliable”273. In a criminal justice system that relies so 
heavily on the testimony of witnesses as a basis for prosecutorial proceedings 
the validity of these recollections must be corroborated; yet the system 
consistently prevents this from occurring effectively.  
The Tadi! case represents the first time that the issue of the protection 
of victims and witnesses was addressed in an international court274. The 
Decision of August 10 1995, set down guidelines and procedural safeguards 
to be applied for the future, granting that in “exceptional circumstances” 
anonymity could be granted for witnesses and victims. It was, however, in 
this same case that the issues of witness anonymity played a crucial role.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Geoffrey Robertson sees the granting of witness anonymity as an 
example of the Tribunal allowing “it’s natural sympathy for victims to 
override its fundamental duty of fairness to the defendant”275. Robertson 
explores the perjury of Witness L in the Tadi! case as an example of the 
dangers of allowing witnesses to conceal their identities before the Defence, 
hoping it will “serve as a warning for the future of international courts”276.  
Dragan Opacic’s testimony formed the basis of the prosecution’s 
accusations that Tadi! had executed 30 male prisoners, raped 12 female 
detainees at a prison camp and killed Opacic’s own father. Having been 
allowed to testify in secret for three days, Opacic was eventually exposed as a 
fraud when the cross-examiner called a man to the courtroom who turned out 
to be the ‘murdered’ father of the witness. If it had not been for this turn of 
events, there is every likelihood that Tadi! would have been convicted on the 
strength of this false testimony. Chrissa Loukas points to the Tadi! case as an 
example of the fallibility of the court system in terms of garnering the truth: 
“If the defence hadn’t been able to uncover what they had needed to in order 
to cross-examine, that would have been the historical record. That [the Tadi! 
case] is a prime example of why you can’t necessarily accept all testimony 
that is proffered before the ICTY as the direct evidence of truth”277.  
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d) Against the Defence?  
The allowance of witness anonymity by the Trial Chamber is one of a 
variety of criticisms leveled at the ICTY in terms of adequately protecting the 
rights of the accused and maintaining the ability of the Defence Counsel to 
mount an adequate counter-argument. The main challenge the Tribunal has 
faced in recent years is to devise mechanisms that expedite its proceedings 
without limiting the rights of the accused278. For a trial to be considered fair, 
and uphold the standards imposed by the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the rights of the accused must be adhered to. As it 
stands, there are many who continue to criticize the Tribunal for allowing the 
rights of the accused to be squandered, and see the RPE as continuing to 
“systematically put defendants at a distinct disadvantage”279.  
The Tribunal’s main organisational problem stems from Article 11(c) of 
the Statute, which provides that its Registry shall serve both the judges and 
the Prosecutor280. Yet, fairness to the defence demands a “complete separation 
of the prosecutorial from the judicial function”281. The only judicial review to 
which the Prosecutor is subject is provided by Article 19(1) of the ICTY 
Statute which “demands that a judge reviews every indictment” and will 
confirm it only if satisfied that “a prima facie case” has been established282. 
Chrissa Loukas is highly critical of the ICTY for its inherent bias in 
favour of the Prosecution, so much so that she stood down from her position !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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at the Tribunal as co-counsel in the case of Mom$ilo Kraji!nik on the grounds 
of “inadequate time and opportunity afforded by the Trial Chamber” to 
prepare and present his defence283. When interviewed, Loukas reiterated that 
“if you are not providing the defence with the resources it needs to properly 
investigate and test allegations, then that is a real issue for the quality of 
justice”284. While not being enshrined in the ICTY Statute as a “pillar” of the 
Tribunal, this external position “limits the Defense’s ability to actively and 
effectively contribute to the administration of justice”285 and directly impacts 
the ability of the counselors to thoroughly investigate the indictment.  
In the “Proposal for an Amendment to the Statute of the ICTY” as put 
forward by the Association of Defence Counsel Appearing Before the 
International Tribunal, the authors argue that the tribunal “can only 
legitimately claim to be promoting international human rights if they also 
safeguard the rights of the alleged violators of those human rights”286. It is 
only through a “healthy defence function” that the legitimacy and fairness of 
all legal proceedings at the ICTY can be guaranteed, as the accused is entitled 
to ‘equality of arms’ between the Prosecution and Defence287. The Proposal 
cites inequality with regard to time for preparation, finances, human !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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resources, translation services and linguistic support, as well as 
administrative support288.  
 
Conclusion  
As a mechanism of post-conflict resolution, the ICTY seeks to voice the 
stories of the victims, prove individual criminal responsibility for crimes 
against international law and create an accurate historical record to facilitate 
reconciliation through a real understanding of the past. In this way, the ICTY 
is exemplary of attempting to undertake and achieve a combination of the 
two societal responses to mass violence proposed by Martha Minow. 
Unfortunately, despite the honorable purported aim of fact-finding, 
institutional and political failings in the rules and procedures of the ICTY 
hinder its truth seeking efforts.  
The legacy of the ICTY will leave an impression on the international 
criminal tribunal’s that come to fruition in the future.  As one of the first 
international criminal tribunals to actively combine the responses of justice 
and truth, the framework established by the ICTY is of the utmost importance 
for future application. It is thus crucial that the failings of the tribunal are 
critically analysed to facilitate clarification and correction.  
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Conclusion  
 
The human rights movement divides the process of establishing 
accountability into two phases289. The first is the justice phase, where those 
with highest responsibility for the most egregious crimes should be 
prosecuted and punished. The second is the truth phase, in which all that may 
be established about the crimes is disclosed. In the long shadow of death, 
mutilation, torture and mass deportation, only a process to secure justice 
seems appropriate as a means to secure accountability290. The prosecution of 
war criminals in a tribunal established by the UN, as seen in the ICTY, is 
particularly significant as it demonstrates a worldwide unity in condemning 
and punishing those criminals. Through this “universal condemnation” we 
see a “reaffirmation not only of the laws that prohibit the crimes that were 
committed but also of the idea of law”291 .  
 In the hopes of building a positive peace, post-conflict societies must 
find a way to deal with the devastation of the past. While the IMT adopted a 
retributive mechanism as it’s primary focus, the ICTY can be seen as having 
adopted a two-prong approach of punishment and reconciliation through 
truth-seeking. This changing approach reflects not only broader trends in 
political and academic thinking in regards to intervention, state sovereignty, 
human rights and international law as have been illustrated, but also a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
289 Neier, A. “Rethinking Truth, Justice and Guilt after Bosnia and Rwanda”, in Human Rights 
in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia ed. Hesse, C and Post, R. (New York: Zone Books, 
1999), p.39 
290 Neier, A. “Rethinking Truth, Justice and Guilt after Bosnia and Rwanda”, p.43 
291 Neier, A. “Rethinking Truth, Justice and Guilt after Bosnia and Rwanda”, p.49 
! *)!
definitive change in the nature of peacebuilding. Fact-finding, truth seeking 
and historicization of past traumas are now seen as valid elements of building 
a positive peace.  
 The mechanism of an international criminal tribunal converts the 
individual or localized impulse for revenge into a state managed process of 
justice and fact finding. In addition, beyond the state we see 
nongovernmental organisations and collections of nations attempting to 
create international institutions as “living memorials to atrocities and vital 
vows for change”292. Long gone are the days when mass violence, state 
sponsored killing and ethnic cleansing could pass unnoticed on a global scale. 
The interconnectedness of today’s world demands knowledge and 
accountability.  
 Throughout this thesis there has been a focus not only on the horrors of 
the atrocities in World War Two Europe and late 20th century Balkans but on 
the choices made in regards to post-conflict resolution through the adoption 
of the mechanism of an international criminal tribunal. With this focus on the 
history of responses to atrocity rather than the atrocity alone, this thesis 
attempts to draw attention to the continuing pursuit of action that deals with 
– and hopes to eventually prevent – mass state-sponsored inhumanity.  
 While some scholars and academics of the international relations field 
see the mechanisms of international criminal tribunals and other 
interventionary methods as a means of deterrence, this is not the argument of 
this thesis. These chapters encapsulate the idea that out of the ashes of 
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genocide and mass violence, life must carry on. Individual communities, 
states and the international community must respond to mass atrocity. Those 
who personally experienced the devastation deserve to be acknowledged; 
bystanders to the injustices must face their own choices about their own 
action or inaction; perpetrators of the horrendous violence deserve to be 
brought to account; and an historical record of incontestable facts must be 
established to prevent denial and hopefully serve as a lesson for the future.  
The two purposes that animate societal responses to collective violence 
are both a product of broader political and academic thinking, as well as 
reactions to the intimate details of the conflict itself. The IMT and the ICTY 
have been analysed jointly for their adoption of the modes of justice and 
truth, for their triumphs and their failures, and serve as frameworks to be 
adopted and adapted by criminal tribunals for the future.  
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